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Security Council

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Letter dated 1 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Libya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On the initiative of the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, a conference for the Libyan parties was held in France on 29 May 2018 aimed at bridging the gap between Libyans and bringing about stability in Libya. The conference was attended by the President of the Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord, the President of the House of Representatives, the President of the High Council of State and the Commander of the Libyan National Army, with the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ghassan Salamé, and a number of State representatives. A joint statement was adopted at the conference emphasizing the eight-point declaration for the achievement of stability in Libya.

Thus, upon instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that we are seeking the support of your esteemed Council for the content set out in the joint statement (see annex) issued at the Paris conference that would lead to the achievement of peace and stability in Libya, while emphasizing the following elements:

1. The need to commit to a constitutional and legal foundation for the elections;

2. To urge all parties to commit to the provisions stipulated in the joint statement, and the need to hold accountable those who obstruct the implementation of the statement;

3. To comply precisely with the timelines set in the statement, namely 16 September 2018 as the date to set the constitutional basis for elections and adopt the necessary electoral laws and 10 December 2018 as the date set to hold parliamentary and presidential elections.

The Government of National Accord is awaiting the strong support provided by the Council for this initiative, in which we see a big opportunity to take Libya out of the current political crisis and achieve safety and stability in the country, and hopes to have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Elmahdi **Elmajerbi**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of the State of Libya to the United Nations

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Annex to the letter dated 1 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Libya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Joint statement by Fayez al-Sarraj, Aguila Saleh, Khalid Meshri, Khalifa Haftar

Paris — 29 May 2018

Recalling the commitment of the international community to support the peace, security, and stability of Libya;

Recalling that the current political and security situation in Libya is not sustainable;

Recalling the resounding call of all Libyans for credible, inclusive, and peaceful elections;

In accordance with the December 17, 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (LPA);

In accordance with the inclusive political roadmap presented at the United Nations (UN) on September 20, 2017, and endorsed by the international community:

Against the backdrop of a Libyan-owned process and the full engagement of all Libyan parties involved, we committed in Paris on May 29, 2018, under the auspices of the UN and in the presence of representatives of the international community, to work constructively with the UN to realize credible and peaceful elections as soon as possible and to respect the results of these elections when they occur. We further agreed to the following principles, in support of the UN's efforts to stabilize Libya:

Recognition of the importance of developing a constitutional basis for elections and support for the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) as he consults with Libyan authorities on a proposal and timeline for adopting the constitution. The adoption of the constitution will be a key moment for the sovereignty of the Libyan nation.

Agreement on the organization of parliamentary as well as presidential elections, as determined by the SRSG, in consultation with the Government of National Accord (GNA), House of Representatives (HoR), High State Council (HSC), and High National Electoral Commission (HNEC). The parties have committed to set the constitutional basis for elections and adopt the necessary electoral laws by September 16, 2018 and hold Parliamentary and Presidential elections on December 10, 2018. Elections must be well-prepared with all the Libyan institutions, to advance the shared objective of stabilizing and unifying Libya.

Commit solemnly to accept the requirements for elections outlined in the SRSG's briefing to the UN Security Council on May 21, including a new session of voter registration for an additional period determined by the High National Election Commission in liaison with the UN.

Libyan leaders commit to accept the results of elections, and ensure appropriate funds and strong security arrangements are in place. Those who violate or obstruct the electoral process will be held accountable.

Agreement to work constructively with the UN to ensure that the required technical, legislative, political, and security conditions are in place for national elections, including the adoption and implementation of the requisite electoral laws by the HoR according to the adopted timeline, and the consultation mechanism with the High State Council (HSC) agreed on in the LPA.

Libya's official security forces, with appropriate support and coordination from the UN as well as regional organizations and international community, will be responsible for safeguarding the electoral process and ensuring the right of all Libyans to peacefully and democratically express their will about the country's future. Any obstruction or interference with the voting process will not be tolerated, and those responsible will be held accountable.

Commitment to improve the atmosphere for national elections by all means possible, including by moving the seat of the HoR in line with the Constitutional Declaration, and working to eventually phasing out bring an end to duplication parallel of government institutions and structures government and institutions, and to for encourage HoR and HSC to work immediately on the unifying of the Libyan Central Bank and other institutions.

Commitment to support the United Nations efforts in building professional, accountable, and unified military and security institutions, to encourage the ongoing Cairo dialogue, and to work constructively toward the unification of Libya's military and security institutions.

Agreement to participate in an inclusive political conference to follow-up on the implementation of this statement, under the UN auspices and with respect for the timeframe and modalities determined by the SRSG, alongside with Libyan institutions. As Libyan leaders make these commitments, the international community stands united in support of all Libyans as they work constructively with the UN toward credible, secure, and peaceful national elections and strive to realize a more prosperous future for the people of Libya through appropriate and substantial reforms to their economic model.

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United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2410 (2018), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) until 15 April 2019 and requested me to report to the Council every 90 days starting from 1 June 2018 on the implementation of the resolution. It covers major developments that have occurred since the issuance of my previous report, on 20 March 2018 (S/2018/241), as well as progress on the two-year benchmarked exit strategy, including dates and indicators for achieving the benchmarks (see annex I), with the goal of transferring tasks and responsibilities to the Government, in coordination with the United Nations country team.

II. Major developments

A. Political situation and related developments

2. A climate of relative stability throughout the period enabled the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, to pursue his reform agenda. On 19 March, the President identified seven priority areas: State reform and political stability; investments; agricultural production and the environment; energy, road and port infrastructure; water and sanitation infrastructure; education; and promoting stability through social projects. He reiterated the need for a closer alignment of international development assistance with those national priorities. With regard to the rule of law, the President prioritized the strengthening of the judiciary; the fight against prolonged pretrial detention and prison overcrowding; the fight against corruption; the establishment of a Permanent Electoral Council; the launch of a national sector-based dialogue; and the strengthening of the Haitian National Police.

3. On 23 March, at the end of a two-day international forum on public administration reform organized by the Government's Office of Management and Human Resources with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other partners, a technical committee comprising representatives of the public and private sectors and civil society was created to prepare a new public administration framework. At a four-day workshop held from 9 to 13 April, the Office elaborated a draft five-year reform plan for the period 2018–2023 to coordinate all efforts to modernize the public administration.

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4. The Government took further steps towards reconstituting the Armed Forces of Haiti. On 13 March, the President appointed the interim command of the army, comprising six officers from the force disbanded in 1995. On 27 March, the interim command assumed its functions. Civil society organizations raised concerns about one of the officers, Colonel Jean-Robert Gabriel, who had been convicted in November 2000, in absentia, for serious crimes by the court of first instance of Gonaïves (Artibonite Department). Some political leaders deemed the appointment of the officers by the executive, rather than by the interim Commander-in-Chief who had assumed command of the force in November 2017, as a sign of increased politicization. The Government also announced plans to recruit 1,500 army cadets by 2019.

5. Building on consultations held in 2017 with key national sectors, on 28 March the President appointed a steering committee of 23 Haitian personalities to lead the national sector-based dialogue, on the theme "États généraux sectoriels de la nation haïtienne". The committee is tasked with leading a series of thematic workshops to be held across the country on political and economic governance, the environment, public security, education, health, cultural identity and social integration. The data collected during those events would contribute to the formulation of a pact for stability and economic and social progress, the primary outcome expected of the dialogue.

6. However, on 16 April, the Chairperson of the committee, Catholic Archbishop Louis Kébreau, resigned, stating that the six-month timeline allocated for the dialogue was too limited. One other member withdrew over differences with a peer, and 4 of the 23 members have not attended the working sessions so far. Some national stakeholders have called instead for the holding of a national conference, in which the Government and the people would evaluate their past and devise a new beginning for the country. The committee continues to refine the methodology of the dialogue before officially launching the process on a yet-to-be announced date.

7. Pending agreement on the joint 2018 legislative agenda envisaged by the executive branch and Parliament, both legislative chambers agreed to prioritize the adoption of draft laws that have, to date, been voted on in one of the two chambers, as well as laws that have a direct positive socioeconomic impact on the population. During the period, three draft laws were adopted by both chambers and transmitted to the President for publication. These include the law on commerce, the law on vocational training and the law on accessibility of buildings for persons with disabilities.

8. On 29 March, on the thirty-first anniversary of the Constitution, the special commission on constitutional amendments of the lower chamber submitted its draft report to the full body for consideration. The report, entitled *Ce que pense la nation*, summarizes the proposed amendments gathered by the commission through year-long consultations with various sectors of Haitian society. It is focused on constitutional provisions regarding the political system and administrative governance.

9. Amid persistent calls from presidential allies in Parliament and the ruling Parti haïtien Tèt Kale party for ministerial cabinet changes to improve government performance, on 23 April, the Prime Minister, Jack Guy Lafontant, announced a partial reshuffle, replacing 5 of his 18 ministers, including the Minister of the Interior and Local Administrations and the Minister of Justice and Public Security. On 27 April, 16 lower chamber parliamentarians requested the Prime Minister to testify before Parliament on allegations of government corruption and non-compliance with legal procedures governing cabinet appointments; however, there was no follow-up before the end of the first regular session of the legislative year of the lower chamber, on 14 May.

B. Economic situation

10. Planned government investment in the agricultural sector and normal rainfall during the fourth quarter of 2017 led to an above-average spring harvest, with increased agricultural output. Inflation, which began to decelerate during the first quarter of 2018, stood at 12.9 per cent in March. Prices are expected to increase, however, when the automatic adjustment mechanism for retail fuel prices is fully implemented by the end of June, as foreseen in the agreement signed by the Government with the International Monetary Fund in February. The fiscal deficit is expected to widen to 3.1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) during the next fiscal year, of which — in the absence of reforms — 1.5 per cent will finance operational losses of the State electricity authority.

C. Humanitarian situation

11. The Government, with the support of the humanitarian country team and donors, began preparations and training for the upcoming hurricane season. A global risk index published in March 2018 ranked Haiti as the fourteenth country worldwide, and first country in the region, that is most vulnerable to the risk of humanitarian crises and natural disasters.

12. Significant gains continued to be achieved in the fight against cholera. From 1 January to 24 March 2018, the Ministry of Health reported 902 suspected cholera cases and nine related deaths. This represents an 80 per cent reduction from the 4,562 suspected cases and an 86 per cent reduction in deaths compared to the 63 deaths registered during a similar period in 2017. While this progress is positive, focused engagement remains essential to fully eradicate cholera.

13. In April, the Famine Early Warning System Network indicated that the precarious food security situation in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma is expected to improve overall. However, the Network signalled a continuing difficult food security situation in the North and Centre Departments.

14. On 12 March, several hundred Haitian inhabitants of Pedernales, Dominican Republic, crossed the border into Haiti following an ultimatum made by some Dominican citizens that they either leave the city or face reprisals for the murder in February of a Dominican couple, allegedly by their Haitian employees. Haiti and the Dominican Republic reinforced their military and police presence on both sides of the border in response, while MINUJUSTH deployed a team to monitor the human rights situation and a formed police unit platoon in support of the Haitian National Police. This was the most serious of a series of similar incidents that occurred during the reporting period, reflecting continued tensions between border communities.

15. Most returnees entered via unofficial crossing points and joined their relatives in other parts of Haiti. Some 225 households were registered in a temporary shelter in Anse-à-Pitres, exceeding its 100-person capacity. The United Nations Children's Fund and the International Organization for Migration deployed protection staff and trucks of non-food items to Anse-à-Pitres. Local authorities and non-governmental organizations provided food, drinking water, health services and hygiene kits to those in the shelter, and financial assistance was offered by the Ministry of the Interior and Local Administrations.

III. Mandate implementation

16. As requested by the Security Council in its resolutions 2350 (2017) and 2410 (2018), MINUJUSTH established a mechanism to monitor progress in the implementation of the benchmarked two-year exit strategy to a non-peacekeeping United Nations presence in the country. The peacekeeping objectives of the Mission were aligned with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework to reflect all United Nations efforts to facilitate the transition towards a sustainable development setting in support of the Government's priorities. A total of 46 indicators with specific targets gauge the 11 benchmarks that are fully informed by the indicators for the appropriate Sustainable Development Goals, in particular Goals 5 and 16 (see annex I). The priority areas defined by the targets and the indicators pertain to aspects of the mandate, are based on national priorities and are considered essential for the longer term with regard to political stability, the rule of law, women and peace and security, human rights and development in Haiti. They include the adoption of the draft Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, strengthened Haitian judicial and prison systems, increased internal oversight and accountability mechanisms in the justice, corrections and police sectors, the establishment of the Permanent Electoral Council, the adoption of the Legal Aid Law, improvements in prolonged pretrial detention, and community violence reduction.

17. Within this framework, MINUJUSTH adjusted its community violence reduction programme and quick-impact projects to increase the participation of marginalized communities and youth at risk in national policing initiatives and rule of law projects, thus contributing to implementation benchmarks 2 and 6 of the two-year exit strategy.

18. The definition and selection process of the indicators and targets addresses the three objectives of: prioritizing and focusing MINUJUSTH activities on a core set of achievable mandated tasks and expected accomplishments to avoid regression, in particular within the time frame of the two-year exit strategy; providing a means to monitor developments in mandated areas that will condition the end of peacekeeping in Haiti; and providing a joint analytical framework for continuity in the programmatic priorities undertaken by the United Nations system as a whole, in consultation with the Government, against the background of the MINUJUSTH drawdown and transition.

A. Security and police developments (benchmarks 1, 4, 5 and 6)

19. The Mission's police component continued to provide operational support to the national police during the period under review by participating in 197 joint temporary checkpoints, 467 foot patrols, 712 vehicle patrols and 4 joint police operations and providing support in 6 crowd control operations related to protests in Port-au-Prince. A breakdown of the composition and strength of the police component is contained in annex II.

20. While considering the significant reduction in uniformed and civilian personnel working on criminal data collection and verification in MINUJUSTH compared to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which may have decreased the ability to capture and record criminal incidents, the overall trend in security reflects a mixed picture. In keeping with benchmark 6, national police data for the period from 2 March to 19 April suggest a continued downward trend in violent crimes, with 56 homicides reported, representing a 50 per cent decrease from the 131 reported for the same period in 2017, over half of which occurred in the Port-au-

Prince metropolitan area. Lynching has also continued to decrease, with 8 cases reported countrywide compared with 15 for the same period in 2017.

21. At the same time, the period under review was marked by increased gang activity in the Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods of Grand Ravine and Martissant and the implementation of several measures by the national police to extend the authority of the State in areas where its presence is minimal and the terrain unfavourable. The measures included increasing the number of police operations, strengthening visibility in strategic police stations in Port-au-Prince and launching community policing. In response to the increased gang activity, the community violence reduction programme, through a bottom-up approach, is fostering complementary initiatives to reduce insecurity, foment dialogue for peace and stabilization, provide support to communities and local institutions and create income-generating activities, in partnership with local and international organizations with prior experience in those neighbourhoods.

22. The disappearance on 14 March of the photojournalist Vladjimir Legagneur, who had been probing into gang activities in the Grand Ravine neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince on an independent photo assignment, reverberated greatly with the national media and raised concerns about the ability of the national authorities to provide a safe environment for the press to operate freely. On 30 March, the authorities announced that two individuals had been arrested in relation with the disappearance, one of them in possession of the victim's phone. The investigation is ongoing.

23. On 3 April, confrontations between rival gangs, including from Grand Ravine, occurred in nearby Village de Dieu, and on 8 April one person was killed in renewed day-long clashes. The incidents affected national highway 2, routing all traffic to the south of the country, disrupted the administrative centre of the capital and led national authorities to deploy specialized police units to restore order. A subsequent operation conducted by the national police on 18 April in neighbouring Portail Léogâne was met with gunfire and did not produce clear results. On 27 April, the national police announced that, beginning on 9 April, it had launched an operation called "Koukouwouj" to counter gangs, particularly in Grand Ravine and Village de Dieu. The operation resulted in the killing of four gang members from Grand Ravine, 18 arrests and the seizure of vehicles and firearms.

24. On 22 April, the national police conducted operations to dislodge armed men claiming to be former Haitian military staff or the reserve force of the armed forces of Haiti in Delmas (West Department) and Péligre (Centre Department). Five individuals were arrested in Delmas; in Péligre, police arrested six people and seized military uniforms, a rifle, a pistol and an imitation firearm. The operations were supported by the MINUJUSTH police component, including its drone unit.

25. Two isolated yet significant acts of violence occurred in April. On 27 April, a unit of the Brigade d'intervention contre l'insécurité foncière was disarmed and chased away by the population of Thiotte (South-East Department) as it was attempting to intervene in a land dispute case. On 28 April, the death of one individual was reported as a result of a teargas grenade having been launched into the venue of a public debate chaired by two Senators in Cap-Haïtien (North Department) on the management of the PetroCaribe fund.

26. National police statistics on rape and other sexual and gender-based violence, albeit consistently underreported, showed a decrease of 62 per cent from 2017, with 92 incidents reported thus far in 2018 compared with 245 incidents over the same period in 2017.

27. The MINUJUSTH specialized police team on sexual and gender-based violence continued to support advocacy efforts to professionalize the national police response in investigation, awareness-raising in preventing cases of sexual and gender-based violence and treatment for victims. Three workshops were organized in Grand-Anse, Centre and South Departments. Each workshop, facilitated by the national police head of the Unité de lutte contre les crimes sexuels, a judge of the Port-au-Prince Court of Appeal and the Director of Courses at the school of magistrates, included 20 participants from all stages of the penal chain. The training was aimed at fostering local ownership and sustainability by bringing together penal chain actors and community leaders to build common understanding on the care of victims, including best practices in prevention. In parallel, 12 working sessions held with community violence reduction programme experts strengthened the capacity of community-based organizations active in the area of sexual and gender-based violence, thus enabling the delivery of four projects.

28. In line with benchmark 4, on developing police response capacity, the three pending sites to be co-located with the national police in West Department and the Strategic Planning and Logistics Directorates were made operational, thereby rendering all 17 co-location sites on national police premises functional and extending the mentorship and advisory programme nationwide. The Budget and Finance Unit of the MINUJUSTH police component partnered with the Directorate of Finance and Accounting of the Haitian National Police to draft the 2018–2019 operating budget and a capital investment budget underpinning the 2017–2021 strategic development plan. The partnership aims to improve the overall budget process within the national police, build a culture of fiscal discipline and apply best practices in public funds management.

29. Ten new police construction and renovation projects, including the provision of communications equipment and furniture, were launched during the reporting period, four of which are financed through the Mission's quick-impact projects, three through the joint rule of law programme 2017/18, two by a bilateral donor and one through the Mission's specialized team on sexual and gender-based violence. MINUJUSTH provided technical support through its drone unit and daily mentoring in strategic planning, budget and finance, communications and information technology, criminal intelligence, infrastructure, and logistics and fleet management, among others. In this regard, a joint pilot initiative between the national police, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and the community violence reduction programme to increase the pass rate of female candidates in the national police selection test is in the early stages of implementation.

30. As at 20 April, all 1,022 new police officers from the 28th class, which graduated in December 2017, were assigned to active duty, bringing the total number of police officers nationwide to 15,198, or 1.36 police officers for every 1,000 inhabitants. A total of 528 new officers were deployed to the 10 departmental directorates, while the Directorate of Prison Administration, the Border Police Unit, the Criminal Investigation Unit and the Crowd Control Unit, among others, absorbed 494 officers, who underwent specialized training at the National Police School before assuming duty. On 5 April, 72 officers of the fifth cohort, including four women, were promoted to the rank of police commissioner upon graduating from the National Police Academy after a nine-month training programme. MINUJUSTH also provided support for the completion of background checks for the 29th class of cadets that began training on 18 February. To date, the 29th class stands at 733 cadets, including 212 women. To achieve the targeted workforce of 18,000 police officers, with at least 12 per cent female representation, by 2021, as set out in the five-year strategic development plan, efforts will need to be redoubled to enlist a combined 2,072 cadets,

including some 600 women, for the next three classes. On 29 April, 6,760 candidates, including 1,008 women, sat the initial selection tests for enrolment into the 30th class.

B. Justice (benchmarks 1, 2, 5 and 6)

31. In line with benchmark 1, MINUJUSTH continued to support the model jurisdiction of Port-au-Prince in the fight against prolonged pretrial detention by working to improve access to justice, handling incoming case files using a real-time case management system and managing the backlog of pretrial cases. This approach supports the strategy of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security to tackle prolonged pretrial detention, which brings together all rule of law actors in a "penal chain committee" that meets monthly to assess progress.

32. As a result of the newly relaunched habeas corpus hearings, on 18 April, 19 cases were adjudicated and consequently 15 pretrial detainees who had been in illegal detention for eight years were released. On 31 March, the prosecutor of the Port-au-Prince tribunal handled 145 same-day transmission cases using real-time case file management. Similarly, the number of cases closed by the investigative judges increased from 74 cases closed in the previous period, from October to December 2017, to 95 between January and March 2018. The number of criminal cases adjudicated by the court of first instance of Port-au-Prince increased from 60 during the period from October to December 2017 to 93 between January and March 2018, including 12 immediate trial procedure hearings.

33. Between 8 March, International Women's Day, and 3 April, National Day of the Haitian Women's Movement, the Port-au-Prince tribunal organized special hearings for more than 20 cases involving women in pretrial detention. UN-Women, with technical support from MINUJUSTH and financing through the community violence reduction programme, has elaborated a legal aid project to reduce the number of women in pretrial detention in the new women's prison, where 80 per cent of detainees are at the pretrial stage.

34. As part of its key contribution to improve access to justice and fight prolonged pretrial detention, MINUJUSTH supported the selection of 38 lawyers, including 14 women and 16 young lawyers, for two legal aid offices in Port-au-Prince funded through the community violence reduction programme. Those offices have focused on handling 50 per cent (1,700 cases) of the backlog of cases of detainees in pretrial detention as well as support to immediate trial procedures and real-time case file management since their official opening on 7 May.

35. With regard to the adoption and promulgation of legislation that improves access to justice, reflected under benchmark 1, MINUJUSTH, through its good offices, continued to engage with the permanent justice commissions of the two parliamentary chambers, as well as both Speakers of Parliament, for a vote on the draft Criminal Code, the draft Code of Criminal Procedure and the draft legal aid law, scheduled for the second ordinary session of Parliament, to begin on 11 June.

36. MINUJUSTH also cooperated with judicial institutions to build momentum around the Government's key rule of law priorities. The Mission's mobile teams supported a series of public forums to raise community awareness on the rule of law. During the period, forums were organized in 13 of the country's 18 jurisdictions, bringing together judges, prosecutors and representatives of bar associations, local authorities, civil society, women's organizations and universities, among others, to examine prolonged pretrial detention that leads to prison overcrowding.

37. In keeping with benchmark 2, the Superior Council of the Judiciary took steps to ensure the timely election of seven of its nine councillors, thereby avoiding any

institutional vacuum ahead of the expiry of its mandate on 3 July. The President and the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation, who are ex-officio members, will remain on the Council.

38. The Technical Vetting Commission, comprising representatives of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Superior Council of the Judiciary, previously handicapped by the absence of the representatives of the Ministry, is now complete and functional. Three representatives of the Ministry assumed their functions in March, bringing the number of members to seven, including two women. The Commission is currently working to validate its mechanism to accelerate the vetting of magistrates, which contributes to progress under benchmarks 2 and 5.

39. Nevertheless, action by the executive branch is required to end protracted delays in completing the appointment or renewal of the term of judges, which are hindering the normal functioning of the judicial system at all levels. At the Court of Cassation, 6 of the 12 judges' seats remain vacant, notwithstanding the launch of a recruitment process in July 2017. In the month of May, the President appointed 41 out of the more than 100 deans of the court, judges and investigating judges awaiting appointment or renewal.

40. The relationship between the Superior Council of the Judiciary and the executive branch remained strained, notwithstanding the establishment at the beginning of 2018 of the joint ad hoc committee to devise a plan to modernize the judiciary in efforts to harmonize their relations. Despite several meetings, no plan was adopted in the first quarter of 2018.

41. Since 2013, the Superior Council of the Judiciary has failed to publish an annual report detailing its activities and the situation of the judiciary in accordance with its legal obligation since 2007. The report should include, among other aspects, an account of critical judicial tasks, such as performance evaluation, the vetting of judges and the inspection of courts and tribunals. Delays in the publication of the report are due to poor organization and the lack of budget and human resources capacity of the technical secretariat. However, the Council has taken some steps to prepare and publish the outstanding annual reports. MINUJUSTH is providing support to the Council through a quick-impact project to assist in the timely collection and processing of statistical data for the preparation of a report on the situation of the judiciary.

C. Corrections (benchmarks 1, 3 and 5)

42. The Haitian penitentiary system continued to be characterized by severe overcrowding (366 per cent occupancy rate) owing to the high incidence of prolonged pretrial detention. As at 8 May, Haitian prisons held 11,802 detainees, including 429 women, and 292 male and 18 female juveniles. Of those detainees, 75 per cent were unsentenced, indicating no change in the percentage of detainees awaiting trial since the issuance of my previous report. Overcrowding places a strain on the available resources, leading to poor conditions of detention and resulting in violations of inmates' rights.

43. Low staffing levels and the inadequacy of budgetary allocations, as the Directorate of Prison Administration does not have authority over its own operational budget, compound the issue. No progress has been achieved in the adoption of draft legislation on the penitentiary system or on elevating the prison administration to the status of central directorate within the national police with autonomy over its own resources.

44. MINUJUSTH is providing technical support to the prison administration to develop and implement a targeted and dedicated recruitment and training strategy to augment staff strength and reduce high turnover. In March, a needs analysis identified the number of candidates to be retained by the prison administration from the 30th and 31st promotions of the national police. In April and May, 42 mid-level staff, including one woman, received administrative and management skills training through two five-day programmes.

45. MINUJUSTH continued to assist the prison administration in the process of certifying prisons in Haiti as capable of operating without full-time international support. The Mission provided targeted support to the prison administration in identifying the tools to assess 9 of the country's 18 prisons against international standards, leading to some improvements in conditions for 8,339 detainees, including access to open air, meals, security, family visits and file processing and management.

46. MINUJUSTH, through its quick-impact projects, improved the potable water and electrical power supply and assisted in the installation of toilet facilities. Meanwhile, the Automated Fingerprint Identification System project at the National Penitentiary has processed the files of some 3,000 inmates with technical support from MINUJUSTH. The project is to be replicated in the prisons in Les Cayes and Cap-Haïtien, where infrastructure refurbishment and electricity installation works, financed through the joint rule of law programme, are ongoing.

D. Human rights (benchmarks 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9)

47. In accordance with benchmarks 7 and 9, MINUJUSTH continued to work with national institutions to strengthen the national human rights protection framework. MINUJUSTH began to transmit to the Office of the National Human Rights Ombudsperson individual cases of human rights violations that it had documented and to train officers at the Office in monitoring human rights violations.

48. Similarly, the Ombudsperson shared with MINUJUSTH cases of prolonged pretrial detention and difficulty in gaining access to justice. Since March, representatives of the Office of the Ombudsperson have joined MINUJUSTH in field visits to monitor access to justice in cases of allegations of sexual violence. In April, MINUJUSTH facilitated an agreement between the Ombudsperson and the Director General of the Haitian National Police to explore avenues of cooperation between the two institutions. The Office will contribute to human rights training for police units and the vetting of police officers. MINUJUSTH will provide technical support to the Office in the two areas mentioned above, as well as in the development of its strategic action plan.

49. Incidents of alleged human rights violations by the national police, in particular allegations of excessive use of force, including against children, continue to raise concerns with regard to the achievement of benchmarks 4, 5 and 6. On 16 March, members of the national police killed a 15-year-old boy and injured a 10-year-old during a private skirmish outside a stadium in Saint Saline-Gonâve (West Department). On 17 March, members of the Unité départementale pour le maintien de l'ordre of the national police injured a teenage boy in Caracol (North-East Department) while dispersing a crowd during a demonstration. In the most recent incident, on 6 April, national police officers injured an 11-year-old girl in Hinche (Centre Department) while pursuing a vehicle suspected of a traffic offence. Internal investigations, including by the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police, are under way, but no judicial investigations have been initiated so far. Similarly, and despite the conclusion of the internal investigation by the General Inspectorate and the appointment of investigative judges, judicial proceedings against national police

officers suspected of the killing and forced disappearance of civilians in the October and November 2017 incidents in Lilavois and Grand Ravine (see S/2018/241, paras. 34 and 35) have not yet been initiated.

50. In line with benchmark 8, civil society organizations continued to call for accountability for past gross human rights violations. On 19 March, during the regular hearings of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, two non-governmental organizations voiced concerns about obstacles to judicial proceedings related to crimes allegedly committed under the Duvalier rule. On 20 March, two other organizations published a report on the same topic, highlighting the lack of progress in the investigation against Jean-Claude Duvalier and his co-accused since his death in 2014. On 26 April, the day of remembrance of the victims of the Duvalier regime, non-governmental organizations organized a series of events to commemorate the victims.

51. On 10 April, unidentified individuals opened fire on the offices of the National Human Rights Defence Network, one of the most prominent human rights organizations in Haiti. The attack took place in the middle of the night and there were no casualties; however, the organization and its employees have been the subject of repeated attacks over the past two decades.

E. Anti-corruption and Permanent Electoral Council (benchmarks 10 and 11)

52. The Mission continued to support anti-corruption efforts, in particular the oversight bodies of the penal chain, namely, the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police. In 2017, the General Inspectorate reported the receipt and investigation of 367 complaints, of which measures were taken for 35 per cent.

53. The memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and UNDP for the implementation of rule of law activities in support of MINUJUSTH was signed on 8 February 2018. Over a third of the $2.28 million in funding addresses support activities for Haitian oversight and accountability bodies, including the General Inspectorate of the national police, the judicial inspection capacity of the Ministry of Justice, the Ombudsperson and national human rights institutions.

54. Further to this, the World Bank provides assistance to improve budget and treasury management, strengthen internal and external controls and reduce misuse of public funds and corruption, and also provides technical support and funding to build capacity within financial oversight and accountability bodies.

55. The financial inspection unit of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance is revising its legal framework before submission to the Government and Parliament for approval. The National Procurement Board designed a two-to-three-year capacity-strengthening programme aimed at reviewing its institutional framework and role in procurement. At the same time, no progress has yet been made on the draft organic law of the Anti-Corruption Unit, the draft organic and procedural laws or the internal regulations of the Superior Court of Audit and Administrative Disputes.

56. The process to constitute the nine-member Permanent Electoral Council has not advanced since 2017. Although the three branches of power launched separate calls for candidates, they have yet to complete the nomination of their three respective representatives. In the absence of a Permanent Electoral Council, Haiti will resort to the customary use of a provisional electoral council for holding the legislative elections expected in October 2019, as has been the case for all elections since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Similarly, indirect elections to establish the

councils and assemblies at the municipal, departmental and interdepartmental levels have remained stalled since July 2017. The absence of the elections of local governance structures, which play a role in the bottom-up constitutional process, also delays the appointment of justices of the peace.

IV. Joint transition planning

57. Since February 2018, MINUJUSTH and the country team have undertaken an assessment of the preparedness of the United Nations for the upcoming transition. This includes an integrated approach that seeks to dovetail the benchmarked exit strategy with the priorities of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017–2021 that have been agreed with the Government. A key element has been a capacity assessment of the country team to assume programmatic aspects of the Mission's mandate.

58. To that end, on 22 and 23 March, a workshop held in Haiti brought together an integrated team, including the Secretariat, UNDP, MINUJUSTH components and members of the country team, to reach consensus on the policies and tools for managing the transition to a non-peacekeeping presence in Haiti. As a result, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017–2021 was identified as the transition planning instrument for the implementation of programmatic priorities during the lifespan of MINUJUSTH, as well as for the preparation of the reconfiguration of the United Nations beyond 15 October 2019. Furthermore, as part of the annual implementation review of the Framework, MINUJUSTH activities and performance indicators were integrated into the Framework workplans. On 19 April, the review was concluded in the presence of over 140 representatives of the Government, the United Nations and civil society.

59. The exercise also allowed for the refinement of specific time-bound targets and indicators for achieving the benchmarks, paving the way for the transfer of tasks and responsibilities to the Government, the country team and other partners, as set out in the two-year exit strategy. These are fully reflected in annex I. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework, developed jointly by the Government of Haiti and the United Nations and signed on 30 June 2017, enhances relations and maximizes engagement with national counterparts and has strengthened the integration between the Government, the Mission and the country team. Accordingly, the Framework's governance and rule of law outcome group will lead data collection, analysis and identification of bottlenecks.

60. The joint transition planning highlighted a strong alignment between the gender-related objectives in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework under gender and protection (outcome 3) and the rule of law (outcome 5) and MINUJUSTH benchmarks, particularly in the areas of women's security and the levels of their participation in security and justice institutions. MINUJUSTH, in active partnership with the country team, national counterparts and women's civil society organizations, will continue to lead strategies that improve analysis and monitoring and strengthen accountability with regard to women and peace and security commitments.

V. Mission support

61. In addition to providing logistical support to MINUJUSTH personnel, particularly the police component, Government-provided corrections personnel and the mobile teams, MINUJUSTH continued work to complete MINUSTAH liquidation activities. Liquidation tasks range from the disposal of assets and the closing out of contracts to the dismantling and removal of infrastructure and installations to return

properties to owners, including handling all environmental matters to ensure that returned properties are free from contamination. This involves closing a number of facilities in Port-au-Prince, as well as progressively shutting down all MINUSTAH structures in the former regional centres by 30 June 2018. In this regard, the consolidation of MINUJUSTH headquarters facilities to minimize the Mission's footprint continues, while facilities where individual police officers are co-located with the national police in Port-au-Prince and in the regions are being renovated.

62. The closing of one mission and establishment of another simultaneously has posed challenges for MINUJUSTH to reach its full operating capability and has placed pressure on its resources, in particular its staff, who in some instances have been required to perform tasks beyond their regular duties. At the time of reporting, 50 per cent of all stockholdings handed over to MINUJUSTH, valued at $20 million, have been verified and readied for transfer to new centralized warehouse structures at the Mission's headquarters. The final batch of 375 assets was commercially sold as part of the liquidation of MINUSTAH. All liquidation activities are expected to be completed by 30 June 2018.

VI. Conduct and discipline

63. There have been no new allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse since the issuance of my previous report. The Mission pursued its prevention activities, including training, public information and outreach, to sensitize the Haitian population to United Nations standards of conduct, specifically the zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, complemented by remedial action through assistance to victims. As part of the outreach activities, a workshop for journalists, held on 20 April, discussed the United Nations zero-tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse to encourage in-depth coverage of the message by the Haitian media.

64. The Victims' Rights Advocate of the United Nations, Jane Connors, appointed as part of my strategy to improve the response of the United Nations to sexual exploitation and abuse, visited Haiti from 22 to 26 April to support the ongoing implementation by United Nations system actors of an integrated, strategic, system-wide approach to prevention and response, in particular in respect of enjoyment by victims of sexual exploitation and abuse of their rights. Along with the MINUJUSTH Field Victims' Rights Advocate, Ms. Connors met with the Mission leadership and staff, agencies, funds and programmes, Haitian authorities and civil society, including the Office of the Ombudsperson. She also met confidentially with victims.

VII. Observations

65. Haiti has come a long way on its path to durable stability, and there can be no room for regression in the gains made in the security sector. I firmly condemn the recent acts of armed violence perpetrated by gangs in the southern neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince and call upon the relevant Haitian authorities to strengthen State authority in the area in order to stem the violence and protect citizens. The circulation of illegal arms in the country and their availability to those gangs is a stark reminder of the urgent work that still needs to be accomplished in licensing and controlling the flow of firearms and in creating opportunities for people, with a particular focus on youth, in neighbourhoods prone to armed violence.

66. I take note of the progress made in the joint implementation of the mentorship and advisory programme in the 17 co-location sites with the national police. Additional efforts are still required to safeguard and build upon the gains that have

been made to guarantee the proper implementation of priority actions of the five-year strategic development plan of the Haitian National Police and to consolidate the independence of the national police. These efforts should also adequately address threats from gangs, organized crime and insufficient budgetary resources that could otherwise hamper progress. At the same time, political will and active collaboration on the part of the Government are essential factors in the coming period.

67. Increased cooperation between key State institutions that are constitutionally required to work together to address the many challenges preventing lasting progress in the functioning of the judiciary will be necessary. The new leadership at the head of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the election of new members of the Superior Council of the Judiciary and, above all, the participatory approach of the sector-based dialogue on justice will be conducive to the development of a genuine judicial sector policy and action plans to implement reforms needed to strengthen the rule of law institutions, guarantee the independence of the judiciary and ensure the efficient functioning of a judicial system legitimized by the confidence of the population.

68. The decades-old phenomenon in Haitian prisons of severe overcrowding owing in part to excessive prolonged pretrial detention and the ill effects of the functioning of the entire judicial system must be tackled with renewed energy, time, effort, political will and adequate resources. I am encouraged by the commitment of President Moïse to fight against prolonged pretrial detention and by the actions undertaken by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in the model jurisdiction of Port-au-Prince. I hope to also see progress in addressing the overcrowding of detainees, the majority of whom have been unable to seek defence counsel and stand trial, as well as results of the recent measures taken to provide legal aid to detainees at the national penitentiary.

69. I remain concerned by human rights violations allegedly committed by the national police, including those in Lilavois and Grand Ravine in 2017. I reiterate my call upon the Haitian authorities to ensure that those found responsible for such actions are promptly brought to justice. I am also disheartened by the lack of progress in identifying and bringing to justice the authors of serious past crimes and violations. Different United Nations human rights mechanisms have encouraged the Government to consider transitional justice mechanisms to bolster national reconciliation efforts and consolidate the stability of Haiti.

70. The establishment of a constitutionally mandated Permanent Electoral Council would be an important and welcome development. While strengthening the sector-based dialogue is under way, it would inspire greater confidence among both national and international stakeholders, ensuring that the holding of future elections is not the object of partisan politics but rather a reflection of a State able to exercise its true democratic values. I strongly encourage all Haitian stakeholders to work together to achieve this important milestone that will bolster the prosperity and stability of Haiti.

71. The steps taken by President Moïse to engage the Haitian people in a sector-based dialogue reflect a genuine desire to move forward with political and socioeconomic development as a unifying national project. I have heard the many voices from State institutions, political parties, the private sector and civil society calling for the crafting of a forward-looking national agenda capable of delivering tangible results for stability and sustainable development. It is important that all Haitian actors take full advantage of this unique window of opportunity and work together to contribute to a long-awaited and meaningful national dialogue. I share the hope of the Haitian people that this will lead to the creation of a pact for greater social and political cohesion, consolidate the gains made in security and stabilization over

the past decade and truly reinforce State institutions to meet the needs of the Haitian people.

72. In that regard, the joint efforts to achieve progress against the 11 benchmarks, further complemented by the Government and the United Nations family with 46 indicators and specific transition dates, as reflected in annex I to the present report, will be essential to the consolidation of stability gains and the establishment of a strong foundation for long-term political stability, security and development in Haiti. I encourage the Government of Haiti to foster greater cooperation with regional organizations, in particular the Caribbean Community and the Organization of American States, and identify and leverage new opportunities for partnership. As the United Nations system prepares a smooth and effective transition towards sustainable development, I encourage the different United Nations entities on the ground and at Headquarters to continue to work as "One United Nations" through a more integrated approach for Haiti. I also call upon the United Nations family and the international community to assist the Government of Haiti to develop a coherent and integrated resource mobilization strategy for the objectives of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017-2021, transition planning and the new approach to cholera in support of government priorities.

73. Progress in this respect will help to prepare a successful transition to a non-peacekeeping United Nations presence in the country and place Haiti on a more assured path to sustainable development. I am confident that the Government, the Mission, the United Nations country team and all international and regional partners will continue to work together to plan for this transition and beyond so as to anticipate, address and mitigate all challenges that may emerge from the withdrawal of peacekeeping from Haiti.

74. I wish to express my gratitude to the women and men of MINUJUSTH and the United Nations country team for demonstrating unwavering dedication and commitment to peace, security and development in Haiti.

Annex I

Benchmark indicators, targets and baselines

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Baseline (as at 2 May 2018)*
1 The executive and legislative branches have promulgated legislation that improves access to justice, enhances the development of the national police and addresses prolonged pretrial detention, which is a cause of prison overcrowding; all branches have initiated implementation of the new legislation, including through sustainable budget allocations	1.1 Existence of the new Criminal Code (1 — draft law initiated; 2 — draft law voted by each chamber; 3 — law promulgated by President)	April 2019	3 — New Criminal Code is promulgated	1 — Draft Criminal Code under review in each chamber's justice and security commission
	1.2 Existence of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1 — draft law initiated; 2 — draft law voted by each chamber; 3 — law promulgated by President)	April 2019	3 — Code of Criminal Procedure is promulgated	1 — Draft Criminal Code under review in each chamber's justice and security commission
	1.3 Existence of the Legal Aid Law (1 — draft law initiated; 2 — draft law voted by each chamber; 3 — law promulgated by President)	April 2019	3 — Legal Aid Law is promulgated	1 — Draft legal aid law under review for separate adoption in each chamber
	1.4 Existence of the organic law on the Haitian National Police elevating Directorate of Prison Administration to a central directorate (1 — draft law initiated; 2 — draft law voted by each chamber; 3 — law promulgated by President)	April 2019	3 — Organic law on national police is promulgated	1 — Draft organic law under review by the office of the Director General of the national police
	1.5 Existence of the Prison Law (1 — draft law initiated; 2 — draft law voted by each chamber; 3 — law promulgated by President)	April 2019	3 — Prison Law is promulgated	1 — Draft Prison Law pending final validation by Directorate of Prison Administration
	1.6 Identification of the implementation requirements by the relevant institutions, including budgetary allocations, for the new legislation (disaggregated by law)	October 2019	Implementation requirements, including budgetary allocations, are determined for new legislation	Implementation requirements not yet identified for new legislation

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Baseline (as at 2 May 2018)*
	1.7 Number of new case files processed in real time by the prosecutors in the jurisdiction of Port-au-Prince	October 2019	800 new case files processed in real time by the prosecutors in the jurisdiction of Port-au-Prince	July 2016–June 2017: 695 of 1,560 new cases processed in real time by Port-au-Prince jurisdiction prosecutors
	1.8 Proportion of detainees in pretrial detention in excess of two years at the civil prison of Port-au-Prince	October 2019	50.4 per cent of detainees in pretrial detention at the civil prison of Port-au-Prince	14 Nov. 2017: 62.2 per cent of detainees at civil prison of Port-au-Prince in pretrial detention (2,256 of 3,626)
	1.9 Number of cases closed by investigative judges in the jurisdiction of Port-au-Prince	October 2019	750 orders issued	July 2017–June 2018: 600 orders issued by investigative judges
	1.10 Number of penal cases adjudicated by the court of first instance of Port-au-Prince	October 2019	800 penal cases adjudicated by the court of first instance of Port-au-Prince	October 2016–September 2017: court of first instance of Port-au-Prince adjudicated 613 penal cases
2. The Haitian authorities make timely, gender-balanced and merit-based appointments in the justice sector, including in the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the Court of Cassation and the Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes	2.1 Existence of the annual report of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, to include: judiciary staffing by gender; judiciary inspection results; number of certified judges; and implementation of judge evaluation process	April 2019	Annual report of the Superior Council of the Judiciary available, including: judiciary staffing by gender; judiciary inspection results; number of certified judges; and implementation of judge evaluation process	Provisions of article 37 of the law establishing the Superior Council of the Judiciary articulates preparation and publication of an annual report. To date, only one report, covering 2012/13, has been published
	2.2 Number of seats filled at the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the Court of Cassation and the Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes, disaggregated by gender	April 2019	Superior Council of the Judiciary: 9/9 (3 women) Court of Cassation: 12/12 (4 women) Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes: 9/9 (3 women)	Superior Council of the Judiciary: 9/9 (2 women) Court of Cassation: 6/12 (1 woman) Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes: 9/9 (2 women)

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Baseline (as at 2 May 2018)*
3. The Directorate of Prison Administration performs key management functions providing basic services to all detainees and ensures respect for their rights	3.1 Number of deaths per 1,000 inmates	October 2019	Ratio equal to or below 10/1,000 inmates	16/1,000 inmates in 2017
	3.2 Number of prisons supported by functioning health services for inmates, disaggregated by gender	October 2019	Nine out of 18 prisons and four largest national police holding facilities supported by adequate health-care facilities for inmates	Prison health-care road map validated
	3.3 Number of Directorate of Prison Administration officers recruited through a dedicated process, disaggregated by gender, out of the 941 new officers required by 2021 to meet the Directorate's needs	October 2019	300 Directorate of Prison Administration officers recruited, of whom 30 per cent are women, out of the total 941 new officers to meet the Directorate's needs by 2021	100 recruits from the 29th promotion of the national police deployed to the Directorate of Prison Administration
	3.4 Number of prisons certified by the Directorate of Prison Administration as being able to operate without full-time support from international actors (MINUJUSTH or others)	October 2019	Nine prisons certified out of 18	Draft evaluation survey exists
4. The Haitian National Police responds to public disorder and manages security threats throughout Haiti, demonstrating elevated levels of professionalism, human rights awareness and gender sensitivity, without requiring international support, as a result of the implementation of the relevant priorities of the strategic development plan of the national police for 2017–2021	4.1 Implementation rate of strategic development plan of the national police for 2017–2021	October 2019	43 per cent implemented (57 of 133 priorities in strategic development plan)	The strategic development plan of the national police is prioritized by criticality. Actions requiring MINUJUSTH presence are ranked top
	4.2 Number of police officers per 1,000 citizens	October 2019	1.45	In 2017, ratio reached 1.36. Target for 2021 set at 1.51
	4.3 Percentage of women police officers	October 2019	11 per cent	In 2017, 9 per cent. Constitution of Haiti sets a 30 per cent target for women in public service

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Baseline (as at 2 May 2018)*
	4.4 Percentage of national police capacity statically deployed outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area	October 2019	40 per cent	In 2017, 32 per cent after graduation and further deployment of the 28th promotion
	4.5 Number of specialized public order units out of the 13 existing units of the national police (12 Unités départementales pour le maintien de l'ordre and 1 Compagnie d'intervention et de maintien de l'ordre) capable of responding to security threats with no MINUJUSTH support	October 2019	All 13 units are capable of responding to security threats with no MINUJUSTH support	Six of the 13 units operate without MINUJUSTH support
	4.6 Percentage of public order/security operations planned and executed by national police without MINUJUSTH support	October 2019	100 per cent of operations without MINUJUSTH support	95 per cent of operations without MINUJUSTH support
	4.7 Percentage of national budget allocated to national police	October 2019	8.0 per cent of national budget allocated to national police	7.1 per cent of national budget allocated to national police
5. Strengthened internal oversight and accountability mechanisms in the justice, corrections and police sectors address misconduct and ensure increased effectiveness and compliance with human rights	5.1 Number of courts of first instance inspected (xx of 18) Number of appeal courts inspected (xx of 5)	April 2019	All 18 courts of first instance and 5 appeal courts inspected by the Ministry of Justice	Nine of 18 jurisdictions inspected in 2015
	5.2 Percentage of allegations of human rights violations against public officials (national police officers, Directorate of Prison Administration officials) investigated by the General Inspectorate of the national police	April 2019	80 per cent of all allegations investigated by the General Inspectorate of the national police	General Inspectorate of the national police: estimated 80 per cent
	5.3 Percentage of confirmed misconduct by national police and Directorate of Prison Administration officers disciplined by the national police	April 2019	60 per cent of confirmed misconduct by national police officers disciplined by the national police	General Inspectorate of the national police: in 2017, 35 per cent of confirmed misconduct disciplined (128/367)

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Baseline (as at 2 May 2018)*
	5.4 Percentage of confirmed crimes or human rights violations committed by national police and Directorate of Prison Administration officers prosecuted by judicial authorities	April 2019	100 per cent of confirmed crimes or human rights violations committed by national police officers prosecuted by judicial authorities	2017: none
	5.7 Percentage of staff of the General Inspectorate of the national police deployed outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, disaggregated by gender	April 2019	30 per cent of projected 340 staff of the General Inspectorate of the national police deployed outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area	June 2017: none of the 198 personnel assigned to the General Inspectorate of the national police are deployed outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area
6. Haitian women and men, in particular those from the most vulnerable and marginalized communities, demonstrate increased trust in the capability and willingness of the justice system to address crime and of the Haitian National Police to provide security	6.1 Proportion of the population expressing satisfaction on how the national police performs at reducing crime	April 2019	88 per cent	2013: 88 per cent of population expressed trust in national police (national police/MINUSTAH survey)
	6.2 Number of youth at risk and women benefiting from community violence reduction/reinsertion programmes demonstrating willingness to work with national police community policing initiatives and law enforcement authorities	April 2019	500 youth at risk and women cooperating with national police community policing and law enforcement authorities	None
	6.3 Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 citizens, disaggregated by gender and age	April 2019	Rate of 9.3 or less of intentional homicide, disaggregated by gender and age	2017: 9.9
	6.4 Number of kidnappings reported in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area	April 2019	50 or fewer kidnappings reported in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area	2017: 60
	6.5 Number of gang-related incidents in the hotspot zones of Cité Soleil, Bel-Air and Martissant	April 2019	18 or fewer gang-related incidents in the hotspot zones of Cité Soleil, Bel-Air and Martissant	2017: 24

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Baseline (as at 2 May 2018)*
	6.6 Number of sexual and gender-based violence cases investigated by national police, reflecting enhanced national police capacity	April 2019	At least 275 cases of sexual and gender-based violence are investigated	2017: 164
7. The national Office for the Protection of Citizens functions independently and protects citizens whose rights have been violated	7.1 Status of performance of the Office for the Protection of Citizens in accordance with the Paris Principles	October 2019	Level of compliance of the Office for the Protection of Citizens with international standards and structural capacity to operate as an independent and effective institution in accordance with the Paris Principles	2017: fully compliant
	7.2 Number of recommendations of the Office for the Protection of Citizens implemented by national rule of law institutions	April 2019	Three recommendations of the Office for the Protection of Citizens implemented by national rule of law institutions	2017: none
8. Civil society organizations, including those representing women, engage with the Haitian authorities to advocate the promotion and protection of human rights, and are empowered to bring allegations of human rights violations to the competent judicial or administrative authorities	8.1 Number of reports prepared and submitted by civil society organizations to international human rights mechanisms	April 2019	Two reports prepared and submitted by civil society organizations to international human rights mechanisms	2016: four reports
	8.2 Number of cases reported by local civil society organizations monitoring human rights violations	April 2019	10 reports published by local civil society organizations monitoring human rights violations	2017: estimated 10

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Baseline (as at 2 May 2018)*
9. National authorities comply with international human rights obligations, including holding individuals responsible for current and past human rights violations and fulfilling their reporting obligations to human rights treaty bodies	9.1 Availability of national plan of action for human rights	October 2019	National plan of action for the implementation of the recommendations made by human rights mechanisms, in particular through the universal periodic review of the Human Rights Council	No national plan of action for human rights
	9.2 Number of recommendations made by the human rights mechanisms accepted by the Government of Haiti	April 2019	Three recommendations made by human rights mechanisms accepted by the Government of Haiti	July 2017–June 2018: one
	9.3 Number of reports prepared and submitted to international human rights mechanisms by the Government of Haiti	April 2019	Two reports prepared and submitted to international human rights mechanisms by the Government of Haiti	2016: four reports submitted (Human Rights Council, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Committee on Enforced Disappearances and Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities)
	9.4 Appointment by the Government of Haiti of a high-level human rights focal point within the executive branch	April 2019	One high-level focal point within the executive branch appointed by the Government of Haiti	No high-level focal point within the executive branch appointed by the Government of Haiti
10. Rule of law and anti-corruption institutions demonstrate increased capacity to fight corruption	10.1 Availability of annual report on public spending by Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes	April 2019	The annual report on public spending of Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes is available	2017 report not yet finalized

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Baseline (as at 2 May 2018)*
11. The Permanent Electoral Council is established through a credible and transparent process and exercises its electoral responsibilities in an independent and transparent manner, without requiring international support	11.1 Nomination by the three branches of their three members for the Permanent Electoral Council, with a view to establishing the Council as an operational and independent body	October 2019	The nine members are nominated and the Permanent Electoral Council is established, is operational and functions independently	Nomination process of the three representatives has been initiated by each branch
	11.2 Update of the electoral lists in preparation of the next electoral cycle	October 2019	The electoral lists are updated	Not yet undertaken
	11.3 Existence of the Electoral Law in preparation of the next electoral cycle (1 — draft law initiated; 2 — draft law voted by each chamber; 3 — law promulgated by the President)	October 2019	3 — Electoral Law is promulgated	Initial preparation under way

Annex II

Composition and strength of the police component of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti as at 15 May

	United Nations police officers		*Formed police units*	
Country	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*
Argentina	1	5	–	–
Benin	–	24	–	–
Bangladesh	–	7	–	139
Burkina Faso	–	14	–	–
Brazil	–	1	–	–
Canada	9	–	–	–
Chad	1	–	–	–
Chile	1	–	–	–
Cameroon	1	–	–	–
Colombia	–	–	–	–
Côte d'Ivoire	1	–	–	–
Djibouti	–	–	–	–
El Salvador	–	–	–	–
Ethiopia	–	–	–	–
France	–	–	–	–
Germany	1	–	–	–
Guinea	–	–	–	–
India	–	280	280	280
Indonesia	–	–	–	–
Jordan	–	138	138	138
Madagascar	1	–	–	–
Mali	–	–	–	–
Mexico	–	–	–	–
Nepal	–	133	133	133
Niger	1	–	–	–
Nigeria	1	–	–	–
Norway	3	–	–	–
Pakistan	–	–	–	–
Philippines	–	–	–	–
Portugal	–	–	–	–
Republic of Korea	3	–	–	–
Romania	–	–	–	–
Russian Federation	1	–	–	–
Rwanda	–	119	119	119
Senegal	8	122	122	122
Slovakia	–	–	–	–
Spain	–	–	–	–
Sri Lanka	–	–	–	–

	United Nations police officers		*Formed police units*	
Country	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*
Sweden	–	–	–	–
Togo	2	–	–	–
Tunisia	1	–	–	–
Turkey	–	–	–	–
United States of America	–	–	–	–
Uruguay	–	–	–	–
Subtotal	**36**	**229**	**45**	**931**
Total, by function	265	976		
Total	**1 241**			

Annex III

United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti: deployment map



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Letter dated 1 June 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to the request of the Security Council in paragraph 61 of its resolution 2409 (2018), I have the honour to submit a 30-day update, covering the period 26 April to 25 May 2018, on political and technical progress towards the holding of elections on 23 December 2018 and obstacles to the implementation of the 31 December 2016 political agreement (see annex).

I would be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

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Annex

Update of the Secretary-General on progress in the electoral process and implementation of the 31 December 2016 political agreement, 25 May 2018

1. The present update, which covers developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 26 April to 25 May 2018, is submitted pursuant to resolution 2409 (2018), in which the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to update it in writing every 30 days on political and technical progress towards the holding of elections on 23 December 2018 and on obstacles to the implementation of the 31 December 2016 political agreement.

I. Key political developments related to the electoral process and implementation of the political agreement

2. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Parliament, the National Council for Monitoring the Agreement and the Electoral Process, and the Independent National Electoral Commission continued efforts to reach key electoral benchmarks set out in the electoral calendar. However, progress in respect of technical and legislative preparations for elections remains marred by distrust among the main political actors.

3. The National Assembly and the Senate adopted, on 30 April and 6 May, respectively, a bill on the distribution of seats for national and provincial legislative elections and for local elections. On 8 May, President Joseph Kabila promulgated the bill in line with the electoral calendar. After a delay of several months, the final list of registered political parties and platforms eligible to stand in the presidential election and in national and provincial legislative elections was published in the official gazette on 11 May. The list included 599 political parties and 77 political groups. Although the electoral law contains provisions against the duplication of political parties, four distinct parties carrying the name of the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (namely, the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social-Kibassa, the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social-Mubake/Rénové, the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social-Tharcisse Loseke and the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social-Tshisekedi), representing competing wings of the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social, were listed nonetheless. Notable absences from the list include the Ensemble pour le changement platform, which supports the presidential candidacy of Moïse Katumbi. The parties that comprise that platform, however, were included in the list. On 14 May, President Kabila signed an order appointing three judges to fill vacancies on the Constitutional Court. In accordance with the rules of procedure of the Court, the new appointees, Norbert Nkulu Kilombo, Jean Ubulu Pungu and François Bokona, were nominated by the Presidency, the High Council of the Judiciary and the Parliament, respectively.

4. Important progress towards establishing a legal framework for elections notwithstanding, Parliament has yet to examine the draft amendment to the 2015 law on public demonstrations tabled by the Government during the ongoing ordinary session. The issue of the replacement of the rapporteur of the Independent National Electoral Commission, who had been nominated by the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social, has yet to be resolved despite repeated requests by the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social. On 5 May 2018, during discussions with the Speaker of the National Assembly, Aubin Minaku, the President of the Independent National Electoral Commission, Corneille Nangaa, stated that the voter registration

of members of the diaspora, scheduled to take place between 1 July and 28 September, would be "technically possible, but difficult".

5. The Government's planned use of voting machines remains a divisive issue. The main opposition parties continued to voice opposition to the use of voting machines, to cast doubts on the integrity of the voter registry, and to question the likelihood of holding timely elections. Following the expiration of the 30 April 2018 deadline for the full implementation of the confidence-building measures set out in the 31 December 2016 political agreement, the Comité laïc de coordination issued a communiqué on 1 May in which it noted that the Government had not addressed the emblematic cases mentioned in the agreement. In addition, the Comité laïc de coordination warned that it would renew its public demonstrations unless conditions conducive to the holding of elections on 23 December 2018 were established.

6. There were persistent media reports suggesting the possible candidature of President Kabila in the upcoming elections. Those reports were fuelled by, inter alia, recent statements by the Permanent Secretary of the Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, and the Acting Governor of Maniema province, Jerôme Bikenge, to that effect.

7. On 9 May, the spokesperson of the Congolese National Police, Colonel Pierrot Mwanamputu, during a presentation to the press, accused an alleged armed element of the Alliance pour la libération du peuple congolais of conspiring with Moïse Katumbi to seize power by force. The same day, Mr. Katumbi's spokesperson, Olivier Kamitatu, issued a communiqué rejecting that accusation.

II. Key electoral developments related to the implementation of the political agreement

Electoral developments

8. On 9 May, the International Organization of la Francophonie (OIF), at the invitation of the Independent National Electoral Commission, commenced an audit of the voter registry, which was scheduled to conclude by 25 May. Twenty observers were associated with the audit process — five each from the presidential majority and the opposition, six from civil society, and one each from the African Union, the Southern African Development Community, the European Union and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The Independent National Electoral Commission was identified as a technical member of the audit team. At the launch of the audit operation, the head of the OIF delegation, General Siaka Sangaré, applauded the audit team's "inclusivity" and stressed that the audit would strengthen confidence in the registry. However, some opposition members continued to contest the timing of the audit of the voter registry, arguing that it had been launched after the promulgation of the law on the distribution of seats.

9. As at 15 May, 258 of the 599 officially registered political parties had signed the Electoral Code of Conduct. However, none of the major opposition parties have signed the document. The Independent National Electoral Commission is finalizing preparations for the opening of centres for the registration and processing of candidates in the provincial elections, which is set to begin on 24 June. Arrangements for the installation of electoral litigation tribunals at the provincial level are ongoing.

10. No further disbursement of funds to the Independent National Electoral Commission was announced during the reporting period. The Government has not signed onto a multi-donor project to support the electoral cycle, PACEC II, which could provide more than $67 million in funding to support the electoral process,

primarily to cover secondary logistics and activities to raise awareness among the electorate. Nevertheless, limited technical support could be provided under PACEC I, of which approximately $3 million in funding remains. Several external partners have expressed their continued willingness to provide support to the electoral process, including financial assistance.

Restrictions on political space and violence in the electoral context related to the implementation of the political agreement

11. Restrictions on the activities of civil society entities and journalists continued. On 27 April, in Kisangani (Tshopo province), three activists from the Lutte pour le changement, who had been arrested on 29 and 30 December 2017 while mobilizing people to demonstrate on 31 December 2017, were sentenced to six months in prison for spreading false information. On 23 April, three other civil society members were arrested by the National Intelligence Agency, and one of them was sentenced to six months in prison for inciting teachers and students from a high school in Kisangani to take part in a demonstration. In Lubumbashi (Haut Katanga province), between 3 and 9 May, two activists from the Lutte pour le changement were subjected to death threats and intimidation for their civil activities, which was followed by the forced disappearance of one of them.

12. The authorities continued to enforce the general ban on political demonstrations. On 1 May, in Goma (North Kivu province), National Police agents detained 31 persons, including 4 women, during a demonstration organized by the Lutte pour le changement to denounce the growing insecurity in North Kivu province, notably repeated massacres in Beni (North Kivu province) and the increasing number of abductions in Goma. On 2 May, in Bandundu (Kwilu province), the mayor of the city banned a demonstration organized by a local citizens' movement to demand the resignation of the Governor of Kwilu province, owing to his mismanagement, repeated political scandals and xenophobic behaviour. On 3 May, in Lubumbashi, the residence of the president of the political opposition platform, Union des nationalistes fédéralistes du Congo, Gabriel Kyungu, was surrounded by National Police agents who were armed with lethal and non-lethal weapons. On 9 May, in Kisangani, agents of the National Intelligence Agency reportedly arrested five members of the Ensemble pour le changement at the site of a political rally in support of presidential candidate Moïse Katumbi. They were subsequently released on 10 and 11 May.

13. However, other demonstrations occurred without incident. On 27 April, a women's march in Beni went ahead unopposed. Peaceful demonstrations by the Lutte pour le changement on 1 May in Beni and Kasindi (North Kivu province) and on 9 May in Lubumbashi also took place without incident.

Confidence-building measures

14. On 8 May, the National Council for Monitoring the Agreement and the Electoral Process announced the creation of an ad hoc commission tasked with advancing the implementation of confidence-building measures and with easing political tensions through the release of political prisoners. On the same day, during an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers chaired by the Prime Minister, Bruno Tshibala Nzenzhe, the Minister of Justice, Alexis Thambwe Mwamba, announced that 4,019 persons, including 1,438 detainees, had been released on parole. The measure, however, excluded the emblematic cases mentioned in the political agreement.

III. Good offices efforts for the implementation of the political agreement

15. On 14 May, my Special Representative met with the President of Angola, Joao Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manuel Domingos Augusto, in Luanda. They exchanged views on a coherent approach coordinated between the United Nations and regional actors in support of credible and inclusive elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

16. During the reporting period, my Special Representative also met with the following individuals and delegations to discuss the electoral process: the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Leonard She Okitundu; the Minister of Planning, Modeste Bahati Lukwebo; the Minister of Decentralization and Institutional Reforms, Azarias Ruberwa; a delegation of the Committee of Families of Political Prisoners, led by Patrizia Diomi; the Coordinator of Ensemble pour le changement/Grand Katanga, Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza; and a delegation of a centrist political platform, Le Centre, led by its President, Germain Kambinga. She also met with General Sangaaré and visited Maniema, Bukavu and Uvira provinces from 3 to 7 May for meetings with the Acting Governor of Maniema, the Governor of Bukavu and other provincial and local actors to discuss issues related to the implementation of the MONUSCO mandate.

IV. Observations

17. I welcome the continued progress made towards the attainment of key electoral milestones, specifically the timely promulgation of the law on seat distribution and the publication of the lists of political parties and platforms, which are prerequisites for the candidate registration process scheduled to begin on 24 June. Distrust persists among political actors over several key issues, however, including the potential use of voting machines and the implementation of the confidence-building measures set out in the political agreement. I urge the Government to take the measures necessary to engender confidence in the electoral process and to demonstrate leadership in making progress towards peaceful and democratic elections, all while adhering to the provisions of the political agreement and the country's Constitution. Allowing the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social to replace its representative on the Independent National Electoral Commission, as provided for in the agreement, is an important measure that would enhance the credibility of the Commission and contribute to a credible electoral process. The duplication of parties carrying the name of the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social in the list published by the Government is also of concern and should be addressed urgently as a means of instilling confidence in the political process.

18. Progress in the implementation of the confidence-building measures and the opening of political space remains critical to building consensus and creating an environment conducive to credible, transparent and inclusive elections. Lifting the ban on public demonstrations would ensure that the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are able to freely express their political and civil rights, in accordance with the Constitution. I therefore encourage the Government to ensure a level playing field and to guarantee an inclusive electoral process for all.

19. Timely and adequate funding for the electoral process remains a key concern. The delayed and uneven disbursement of Government funds to the Independent National Electoral Commission could adversely affect the timelines provided for in the electoral calendar. Any such delays risk triggering significant political tensions. I therefore urge the Government to abide by its commitments to ensure the regular

disbursement of funds to the Commission. The United Nations stands ready to provide ongoing technical and logistical support to the electoral process and will ensure that such support is provided within the timelines of the electoral calendar. MONUSCO will continue to work with the Government in respect of its requirements for technical and logistical support.

20. Continued cooperation and coordination among all partners of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is essential to ensuring that international efforts are aligned to assist the people in the pursuit of their legitimate democratic aspirations. There is also a need to sustain the undivided support of the members of the Security Council and of international and regional partners to help to overcome political, technical and logistical challenges to a peaceful and transparent electoral process in the country at the end of 2018.

United Nations S/2018/529

Security Council

Distr.: General
4 June 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 1 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement (see annex) that my delegation had originally intended to deliver, as Chair of the Summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, at the Security Council meeting on "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question", held today.

It is deeply regrettable that our request to be included on the list of speakers, in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, was not accommodated owing to the objection of one permanent member of the Council.

Preventing a Member State from expressing its position on an important matter in its region is against the very spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Permanent Representative

18-08833 (E) 050618

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Annex to the letter dated 1 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement by the Republic of Turkey at the Security Council meeting on "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question"

We are here today, once again, to talk about the injustice and suffering that the Palestinians have been enduring for decades.

While the illegal occupation continues, the Palestinians now face the ill-intended efforts to erode the established parameters for a perpetual peace.

And, to top it all, they are struggling for their right to life: the most fundamental of all human rights.

What we have been witnessing in the last few weeks is a total disregard of all the values we have vowed to uphold since the establishment of the United Nations system and a clear violation of international law.

We need to remember what has happened. Turning a deaf ear to the calls of the vast majority of the international community and in violation of international law, the United States Administration decided to implement its decision of 6 December 2017.

The Palestinian people chose to peacefully stand up against this irresponsible act. Israel responded with impunity and deliberately targeted and killed 62 Palestinians, including children, on 14 May in Gaza. Once again, it failed to comply with its obligations under international law. It refused to assume its responsibilities as the occupying Power, in particular regarding the protection of civilians.

A total of 118 Palestinians, including 15 children, have been killed and thousands injured since the beginning of the Great March of Return. These are not just numbers; these are human beings.

Targeting civilians has no excuse, no justification whatsoever. International law dictates that even in wartime, civilians are not to be attacked or harmed. No State is above the law.

Turkey, as Chair of the Summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), convened an extraordinary summit in Istanbul on Friday, 18 May, to express the collective reaction of OIC to the latest developments. As mandated by the final communiqué issued at this summit, we will continue to support our Palestinian sisters and brothers in any way we can in their request for protection and accountability.

Kuwait, with the full backing of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, took an important initiative and prepared a resolution with the aim of ending the embarrassing silence of this Council in the face of the loss of human lives.

Regrettably, today, the United States used its veto power to block a resolution on the protection of civilians that calls for full respect for international human rights law and international humanitarian law and condemns all acts of violence against civilians.

The Council once again failed to shoulder its responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. It is becoming all the more difficult to convince the international community on the credibility and relevance of the Security Council.

Let's face it: the international system of values and principles that we have established together is faced with serious flaws and blows. It is our collective duty to stand up against this. We have to show that common sense and respect for international law prevail. The system must be set right. We will continue to voice our strong objection to injustice. We will not get used to it. We will not give up.

United Nations S/2018/530

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 June 2018

Original: English

Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, in its communiqué of 12 June 2017 (PSC/PR/COMM.(DCXCI)), and the Security Council, in its resolution 2363 (2017), authorized a two-phase reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In accordance with the request to conduct a review contained in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 31 January 2018 (S/PRST/2018/4), a joint African Union-United Nations review team visited Khartoum and Darfur from 2 to 13 April 2018. The team was co-led by the African Union Commission and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and comprised representatives of the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretariat, including the Peacebuilding Support Office. The team also included staff from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for Darfur, representing, respectively, the United Nations country team and the humanitarian country team. The review team held consultations with UNAMID, officials of the Government of the Sudan and the United Nations country team, visited all five states of Darfur and a number of team sites, and met with state and local authorities, the native administration and representatives of the communities of internally displaced persons.

2. The present report covers the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018, and provides an analysis of the conflict, depicting the current security situation and conflict drivers in Darfur, the political and humanitarian situation and the development needs critical to avoiding a relapse into conflict. It assesses the situation in line with the requirements of the statement of the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2018/4) and presents a whole-of-system approach for Darfur, which includes a new mission concept that contains adjusted priorities for UNAMID and a transition concept for withdrawal over a two-year time frame, during which the mission will work in collaboration with the United Nations country team in order to sustain peace in Darfur.

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II. Conflict analysis

3. The security situation in Darfur has remained relatively stable, following military gains by the Government of the Sudan against the rebel movements since 2016 and a decrease in large-scale intercommunal clashes as of mid-2015, leading to the consolidation of State authority across Darfur, except for small pockets in the Jebel Marra area. Overall, the situation in Darfur has evolved significantly from the height of the conflict in the late 2000s, when the situation was marked by an armed conflict between Government forces and non-State actors. Today, conditions are better described as those of lawlessness and criminality, aggravated by a protracted humanitarian crisis, continued human rights violations and the lack of development. On the political front, the Darfur peace process remains incomplete, and implementation of the outstanding provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur requires new impetus. There have been, however, encouraging developments regarding the constitutional review based on the outcome of the national dialogue.

Security analysis

Fighting between the Government of the Sudan and armed groups

4. No major armed confrontations have taken place between the Government of the Sudan and Darfur rebel groups since 1 July 2017, except for small-scale clashes in eastern Jebel Marra from March to May 2018. The Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), the Sudan Liberation Army/Transitional Council (SLA/TC) (a splinter faction of the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW)) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have been unable to maintain a sustained presence in Darfur or elsewhere in the Sudan, despite being involved in minor clashes described in the assessment of phase one of the reconfiguration of UNAMID (S/2018/12). In its letter dated 28 December 2017 (S/2017/1125), the Panel of Experts on the Sudan confirmed the involvement of those groups in mercenary and other illegal activities in neighbouring Libya and South Sudan. Recent reports indicate that SLA/MM is currently not capable of launching offensive operations against Government forces in Darfur, and that JEM is under significant pressure to leave South Sudan, as it is militarily weakened and fragmented.

5. The limited area and scale of the clashes observed in eastern Jebel Marra since early March 2018 testify to the fact that, while the small groups associated with SLA/AW continue to have some operational capabilities, they are largely contained.[1] The letter from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan and other reports indicate the involvement of SLA/AW in extortion against internally displaced persons and acts of criminality contributing to intercommunal clashes. The recent fighting, according to a UNAMID fact-finding mission, may have been associated with the burning of a number of villages and the displacement of several thousand people in the area of Rockero in April 2018.

6. Although the Government and the armed groups have not agreed on a permanent ceasefire, they continue to extend temporary cessations of hostilities. On 19 March, the President of the Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, extended the Government's unilateral ceasefire until 30 June 2018, while SLA/MM, SLA/TC and JEM have extended theirs until 6 August 2018.

[1] See the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID dated 25 April 2018 (S/2018/389) for a detailed account.

Security sector issues

7. Structural adjustments to the security sector are required to reflect post-conflict realities, and militia groups and the proliferation of weapons remain two immediate issues of concern (see also S/2017/437). Despite the capture of two notorious militia leaders, Abdallah Rizkallah and Musa Hilal, in November 2017 (see S/2018/12, para. 12), militia groups of particular communities continue to hamper the return of internally displaced persons over land and natural resources, with long-term implications for stability. In North Darfur, the northern Rizeigat militias associated with the Border Guards remain a challenge for the Beni Hussein in Sereif and Saraf Omra, due to their stake in gold mining. In South Darfur, Fallata militias often attack Masalit communities over land ownership around Graida, and militias from the Misseriya, northern Rizeigat and Zaghawa tribes frequently attack Fur displaced around Kass. In addition, during the recent clashes in eastern Jebel Marra, militias were responsible for the destruction of several villages and the displacement of the population in the area. In East Darfur, militias of the southern Rizeigat and Ma'aliya tribes are heavily involved in the conflict over land and resources in the areas north of Ed Daein. Many northern Rizeigat and Salamat militias associated with the Border Guards continue to harass Fur displaced in the areas of Mukjar, Bindisi and Um Dukhun of Central Darfur. Finally, in West Darfur, militias mainly from the northern Rizeigat and the Misseriya and Chadian Zaghawa tribes prevent local farmers and internally displaced persons from accessing their farmlands around El Geneina and in Kuraynik.

8. The weapons collection campaign and the deployment of Government security forces have largely improved security across Darfur. While the overall numbers remain unknown, local authorities and the native administration credit the campaign with a reduction of intercommunal violence and criminality. However, some communities of internally displaced persons believe that the campaign targets specific communities.

9. Security has been negatively affected by the limited presence and capacity of law enforcement and rule of law institutions outside the main population centres. Although there is a steady increase in the number of cases resolved by rural courts, which are at the forefront of addressing land disputes, their geographical reach remains limited. In addition, the limited presence and capacity of the Sudanese police forces in rural areas leave returnees, internally displaced persons, women and children particularly vulnerable, including to sexual violence.

10. It is necessary to stabilize the security sector within the framework of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and the African Union policy framework on security sector reform. A wider reform of the security sector in line with the Doha Document (art. 67, para. 399 and art. 74, para. 463) could be conducted in line with the principles of the framework on security sector reform, which ensures national ownership and alignment with conflict prevention, peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction.

Intercommunal conflicts

11. Large-scale intercommunal clashes have subsided since mid-2015 and the majority of conflicts over land and natural resources are now also of a significantly lesser scale. Exceptions include clashes between the Ma'aliya and southern Rizeigat over land and cattle rustling in East Darfur, which in July 2017 killed 43 on both sides; between the Zaghawa and various nomadic tribes in West Darfur over natural resources in October 2017, leading to fatalities on both sides; and among the Fallata, the Masalit and the Salamat, and between the Habbaniya and the Salamat in South Darfur, over land and access to water.

12. Interventions by the Government and reconciliation efforts by the native administration, supported by UNAMID, have mitigated the escalation of intercommunal conflicts in Darfur. In the case of the clashes between the southern Rizeigat and the Ma'aliya in East Darfur, the Governor intervened by arresting native administration leaders accused of inciting the communities, and deployed the Rapid Support Forces in late July 2017 to disarm the tribal fighters. In the wake of the clashes between the Zaghawa from Chad and nomadic tribes in West Darfur in early 2018, the Joint Chad-Sudan Border Monitoring Force intervened effectively to pacify the security situation and the local authorities mediated a solution.

Political analysis

Darfur peace process

13. Despite continued efforts to reach a negotiated settlement with the non-signatories, the negotiation process has not yielded any tangible results during the reporting period. In February 2018, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, which continues to lead the political process at a national level, briefed the Peace and Security Council on the challenges they faced with regard to the peace process within the context of the Roadmap Agreement for Ending the Conflicts in Sudan of March 2016. Subsequently, in its communiqué dated 20 February 2018 (PSC/PR/COMM.(DCCLIV)), the Peace and Security Council urged the non-signatory Darfur armed movements to commence, within three months, engagement for peace and reconciliation in Darfur on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The opposition Sudan Call, including the Darfur armed movements, then met in Paris from 13 to 17 March to adopt a joint position on the review of the Roadmap Agreement. On 17 April, the pre-negotiation talks between the Government of the Sudan and two of the non-signatory groups (SLA/MM and the Gibril Ibrahim faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM/Gibril)) organized in Berlin by the Government of Germany failed to reach an agreement on a declaration of principles, as both movements continued to dispute the status of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as the framework for negotiations.

Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

14. Modest progress has been made since the submission of the letter dated 30 August 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/747) on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, but the status of the commissions related to the Doha Document and the implementation of projects from the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund remain largely the same as reported in the assessment of phase one of the reconfiguration of UNAMID (S/2018/12).

15. Consultations related to the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation process at the national and local levels were completed in 2017, and preliminary consultations were conducted with refugees in Chad from 11 to 26 April 2018. On 7 April, the Government of the Sudan signed an agreement with the Islamic Development Bank for a grant of $63.3 million to South Darfur to support the implementation of the United Nations Fund for Recovery, Reconstruction and Development in Darfur.

16. In an important development, on 15 and 16 April 2018, the Darfur Land Commission, in coordination with UNDP, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, organized a conference on land in the Sudan to discuss progress on land management programmes, issues of land tenure and the establishment of a national land commission to oversee the implementation of the Unregistered Land Act of 1970.

Land issues and impact on return of internally displaced persons

17. Land and natural resources remain at the heart of intercommunal conflicts and constitute the key to durable solutions for internally displaced persons. Taking into account the impacts of climate change and desertification in Darfur, accountable and effective land management is also a key factor for stability in Darfur in the long run. Those issues pre-date the conflict in Darfur, which exacerbated a system already under pressure from a dysfunctional legal framework, the environment and contentious political decisions. The war resulted in significant displacements whereby mainly Fur and Masalit tribes lost their fertile lands to several Arab nomadic tribes and, in search of pasture and livelihood, joined the counterinsurgency. Political will and long-term interventions are required regarding those issues.

18. The right of return and the restitution of property is stipulated in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (art. 52, para. 260). The Property Claims and Restitution Committee of the Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission, part of the Darfur Peace Follow-Up Office as of January 2017, has made some progress, but has suspended its work owing to a lack of funds. In addition, the Doha Document provides for the establishment a land database and a land commission mandated to develop recommendations for state legislatures and serve as an arbitration forum on disputes related to land rights.

19. In North Darfur, the Governor directed local commissioners to collaborate with the native administration and the Ministry of Physical Planning and Public Utilities to register individual lands, and settlers have also been notified to leave occupied plots of land to enable returns. However, recently some 176 households from the Sortony internally displaced persons site, who had voluntarily returned to their areas of origin, were subsequently forced out by the current occupants.

20. In Central Darfur, in March 2018, a joint committee of Fur leaders, the native administration and members of the peaceful coexistence committees arbitrated disputes over land between internally displaced persons and Khozam, Beni Halba and Salamat settlers, agreeing that the settlers would not cultivate new crops without the permission of the landowners.

21. In South Darfur, in May 2016, the Governor issued a decree restoring the rights of internally displaced persons and refugees to the lands and houses they had left behind in February 2003, and issued land ownership certificates for returnees in some areas. Despite that, in January 2018, the Fallata denied Masalit returnees access to land, and the internally displaced persons returned to the camp in Graida to avoid conflict.

22. In East Darfur, the state government amended the Land Acquisition Act of 1930 by adding a restitution policy to provide an opportunity to reclaim and formalize land ownership rights through the courts. In support of that policy, the state government has established two committees to verify proof of land ownership and registration and to conduct a sensitization campaign on the state government's return strategy.

Humanitarian situation

23. The Sudan has faced two major overlapping humanitarian challenges since 2003: one triggered by the impact of the conflict, which has led to large-scale population displacement; and another due to climate conditions, which has contributed to food insecurity and malnutrition. Many communities continue to lack access to services and support. Humanitarian assistance to the Sudan has declined over the years, and Darfur remains the most affected region. The implementation of the humanitarian response plan for the Sudan developed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat (see www.unocha.org/sudan)

faces serious funding challenges, and at the time of writing was 23 per cent funded. In Darfur there are 159 humanitarian entities, including 14 United Nations agencies and other international organizations, 39 international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 106 national NGOs.

24. According to the report of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs entitled "Sudan 2018 humanitarian needs overview" and its report entitled "Sudan 2018 humanitarian response plan, January–December 2018" (see www.unocha.org/sudan), there are 1.997 million internally displaced persons in the Sudan, some 1.6 million of whom are registered as living in camps in Darfur. While assessments of the number of unregistered internally displaced persons vary considerably, United Nations humanitarian agencies and partners estimate that an additional 500,000 internally displaced persons live in host communities and settlements in Darfur. The number of refugees from South Sudan in Darfur currently stands at about 174,000. Some 625,000 people have returned to their places of origin since 2003, including 301,000 civilians, approximately 197,000 internally displaced returnees and 104,000 refugee returnees between the beginning of 2015 and October 2017. Internally displaced persons most frequently cite safety and security, access to land and access to basic social services as the primary conditions for their voluntary return.

25. With regard to food security, the Famine Early Warning System Network has reported very poor pastoral and agricultural seasons in North Darfur, which could result in increased need for food assistance and agriculture and livestock-based livelihood support until mid-2018. In addition, the current economic crisis and recent fuel shortages have a negative impact on agriculture and are pushing more people into food insecurity. Restricted access to land, limited agricultural labour opportunities and low asset holdings resulting from insecurity in Jebel Marra continue to limit household production. The clashes in east Jebel Marra since March 2018 have had an impact on humanitarian operations, causing three NGOs to temporarily suspend or delay activities.

Development needs to avoid relapse

26. Since 2016, improvements in the security situation have led to a shift towards early recovery and peacebuilding. Recovery and development efforts are hampered by low confidence in governance and rule of law institutions, the destruction of infrastructure, limited livelihoods and employment opportunities, the erosion of social cohesion and community stability, unresolved land ownership, the unsustainable management of natural resources and poor access to basic social services. As a result, many conflict-affected people are still dependent on humanitarian assistance. Climate change is having severe consequences in the form of land degradation and desertification and competition over land and water, which is further aggravated by poor management and low institutional capacities to mitigate risks.

27. A low percentage of children in Darfur have safe access to basic education, and its primary health-care services are characterized by low coverage, the inadequate provision of essential services and limited accessibility. In addition, certain practices raise serious protection concerns, specifically with regard to the security of women and girls, who are subjected to gender-based and sexual violence.

III. Progress on implementing phases one and two

Two-pronged approach

28. The UNAMID two-pronged mission concept combines peacebuilding/stabilization measures and peacekeeping tasks to adapt to the needs of the population in Darfur. While UNAMID successfully set up the Jebel Marra task force at the end of phase one, conducting operations in accordance with the priorities within the peacekeeping prong, the mission encountered challenges in the implementation of its peacebuilding/stabilization strategy within the parameters of its mandate. Even though the integrated strategic framework was adopted in September 2017, insufficient emphasis was put on communication and cooperation with the United Nations country team with regard to joint planning, programming and implementation. The mission's limited peacebuilding activities in the rule of law, police, child protection, human rights and community stabilization sectors continued, but without any coherent overarching guidance or strategy in support of the United Nations country team or the local governments.

Closure of team sites and impact of the mission's withdrawal

29. The closure of 11 team sites during phase one of the mission's overall reconfiguration has not had a negative impact on the security situation in the areas of withdrawal. Government authorities, including the police and judiciary, are gradually establishing their presence, and local communities generally cite humanitarian and development needs as their greatest concerns. However, the mission's withdrawal has reduced its monitoring and reporting capacity in those areas.

30. In North Darfur, UNAMID withdrew from six team sites, namely Um Kaddadah, Mellit, Al-Malihah, Tine, Zamzam and Abu Shouk camp. In all locations the security situation was stable and the withdrawal of UNAMID has not had, for the time being, a negative impact. In Um Kaddadah, the local authorities raised concerns about the lack of land registry, as well as concerns about the lack of water, seeds and fertilizer. In Mellit, internally displaced persons raised concerns about the absence of Sudanese police forces inside the camps and outside Mellit town, while locals raised concerns about the lack of medicine and water. Plans for the return of internally displaced persons are being hampered by the lack of basic services and protection concerns, including the establishment of police presences in the areas of return. In Al-Malihah, the Rapid Support Forces are heavily present to ensure the control of the border with Libya and to prevent the infiltration of armed rebel groups. In Tine, the Joint Chad-Sudan Border Monitoring Force is providing effective security, which is creating conducive conditions for the expected return of up to 20,000 Sudanese refugees from Chad. In Zamzam, internally displaced persons raised concerns about the low presence of Sudanese police forces and the occupation of their lands by new settlers, while in Abu Shouk camp concerns were raised regarding the lack of access to food, water and health services.

31. In South Darfur, the closures of Tulus and Edd al-Fursan have also not had, for the time being, a negative impact on the security situation. In Tulus, a number of refugees from the Central African Republic arrived, while in Edd al-Fursan the weapons collection campaign contributed to the absence of clashes between farmers and herders. Some community leaders raised concerns about the Rapid Support Forces harassing the local communities. International NGOs reported unhindered access to the target communities. In Tulus and Edd al-Fursan, there were specific requests for tools to enhance agricultural production.

32. In West Darfur, the closure of the Habila and Foro Burunga team sites did not have an adverse impact on security. However, in both locations, the number of Sudanese police force personnel remained the same despite plans to deploy additional police officers. In East Darfur, the closure of the Muhajiriyah team site did not affect security, but community leaders requested more food, shelter, seeds, farming tools and medical care.

Team sites handed over to formed police units

33. As at 31 May 2018, the handover from the military to formed police units was completed at six team sites, and the final handover, at Kalma, is scheduled for June 2018, as planned. Since the handover of those sites, no threats of a military nature have been observed. The presence of Sudanese police forces and the judiciary remains limited in Korma, Sereif and Saraf Omra, where militia elements are increasingly turning to criminality. Communities have raised concerns that the formed police units are not engaged sufficiently in outreach and patrolling, particularly in Saraf Omra. It was noted during the review mission that the current formed police unit strength of 140 officers is insufficient to adequately cover camp security and perform mandated tasks, and that the support provided by the units to the activities of individual police officers is very limited.

Operating environment

Attacks and threats of attacks

34. During the reporting period, UNAMID was not the target of any armed groups or entities in Darfur. However, banditry and criminal activities remain a prominent feature of the security situation in Darfur owing to several factors, including the deterioration of economic conditions, the conflict over natural resources and the presence of weapons among citizens. From July 2017 to 15 May 2018, 184 criminal incidents affected United Nations personnel, facilities and operations, including 63 cases of theft/break-in/burglary/intrusion, 36 attempts of theft, 5 carjackings, 11 cases of robbery/road banditry, 7 shootings and 33 cases of stone-throwing.

Access restrictions

35. Over the past two years the number of access restrictions experienced by the mission has decreased significantly. There were nine cases of restrictions from 1 July to 31 December 2017, and four cases from 1 January to 31 March 2018. In April and May 2018, there were three cases of denials of access registered in the Jebel Marra area as clashes with rebel groups continued. Restrictions on direct flights between team sites continued as the Government insisted that flights be routed through state capitals.

Visas and customs clearance issues

36. Since 1 July 2017, the Government has granted 2,854 visas to UNAMID, including 441 for military personnel, 980 for police personnel, 91 for civilian staff and 1,342 for other categories. A total of 130 visa requests are still being processed, while 161 visa requests have been pending beyond the normal approval period of 15 days, some since April 2017. For the Human Rights Section, 17 visa applications remain pending, including for the Head of the Section, resulting in a vacancy rate of 32 per cent, while the overall vacancy rate for the mission's international civilian staff decreased from 17 to 6 per cent, of which 3 per cent is due to pending visas.

37. The Government of the Sudan continues to release food ration containers from Port Sudan. While progress has been recorded in clearing other shipments, 23 shipments of contingent- and United Nations-owned equipment are still pending.

UNAMID continues to hold monthly technical-level meetings with Government officials in an effort to address pending issues. The Government informed UNAMID in February 2018 that it would receive a communication detailing new procedures that would replace the tax exemption certificate; however, the mission has yet to receive it.

IV. Whole-of-system approach to Darfur

38. For the second dry season in a row, fighting between the Government and the rebel groups has subsided and has remained sporadic in some areas of the Jebel Marra. However, while the security situation is much improved and the Government has been successful in consolidating authority across most of Darfur, the underlying conflict drivers, including land and resource distribution, remain largely unaddressed. Until a comprehensive solution to those difficult issues is reached, the possibility of a relapse into conflict cannot be entirely discounted. While peacekeeping activities should focus on the most precarious areas, where the protection of civilians, humanitarian support and the mediation of local conflict remain a necessity to further the peace process, a substantive investment in peacebuilding, recovery and development throughout Darfur is crucial to furthering the peace process in Darfur. The United Nations country team and UNAMID should define joint priorities and work hand in hand, including with other partners, and focus on activities and issues to prevent a relapse into conflict.

A. Peacekeeping concept

Redefined priorities

39. Within the whole-of-system approach, UNAMID would focus on mediation of the political process and at the local level, physical protection, the clearance of explosive remnants of war and emergency relief. Those tasks would be combined and coordinated with the humanitarian country team in order to focus efforts on stabilizing a redefined, smaller area of operations. The redefined priorities would include: (a) the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and reporting, the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel; (b) mediation between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur; and (c) mediation at the local level to address intercommunal or other local conflict that could undermine the security situation in the area of operations.

Redefined area of operations

40. Within the refined priorities of the peacekeeping operation, UNAMID would have its headquarters in Zalingei (Central Darfur), and its area of operations would include the following 13 team sites: Kutum, Saraf Omra, Kabkabiyah, Tawilah, Sortony and Shangil Tobaya (North Darfur), Zalingei, Nertiti and Golo (Central Darfur) and Kalma, Kass, Menawashei and Khor Abeche (South Darfur). All other team sites and supercamps would be closed. The supercamp in El Fasher would be downsized and serve as the main logistics hub until the liquidation of the mission. Building on existing United Nations country team structures, the state liaison offices in El Fasher, El Geneina, Nyala and Ed Daein would be managed by the United Nations country team and fall under its respective security arrangements. Each office would consist of United Nations country team staff, including 20 to 25 civilian staff and police from UNAMID. Details for each liaison office would be tailored to the respective context in the respective Darfur state and elaborated jointly by the United

Nations country team and UNAMID. The mission would be fiscally responsible for the establishment and sustainment of those offices for two years, as of July 2018.

Military concept

41. With the closure of 14 sites, the operational capability of the mission's force in Jebel Marra would be improved by allocating more military assets, mainly enablers and reserves, for peacekeeping operations, improving the force's outreach in the new area of operations. Of the 13 team sites in the new area of operations, the Kutum, Tawilah, Shangil Tobaya and Khor Abeche team sites would be handed over to UNAMID formed police units. Separate troops would be earmarked to provide protection to the supercamps until their respective closures or transitions.

42. By 31 December 2018, the force would comprise three components: (a) the force for mandate implementation (force headquarters, three battalions, one reserve battalion, a military police unit and enablers); (b) the temporary protection element for the El Fasher logistics hub (two companies); and (c) the temporary protection element for the three supercamps at Nyala (two companies), Ed Daein (one company) and El Geneina (two companies and a level 2 medical facility) for a total of five companies and one medical facility. The present level 3 medical facility at Nyala will be downgraded to level 2 and shifted to Zalingei as part of component (a). The overall strength of the force would be reduced by 31 December 2018 from 8,735 to 5,470 military personnel, including 4,220 personnel for component (a), 350 personnel for component (b) and 900 personnel for component (c). The seven companies (two for component (b) and five for component (c)) and the level 2 medical facility at El Geneina, nominated as the temporary protection element for the supercamps at El Fasher, El Geneina, Nyala and Ed Daein, and one engineering company would be repatriated no later than 30 June 2019. The overall strength of the force would be reduced to 4,050 by 30 June 2019.

43. The mandate implementation component of the force would operate from force headquarters in Zalingei and out of six team sites: Kabkabiyah and Sortony, Kass and Menawashei, and Nertiti and Golo. To ensure permanent presence in the area of operations, UNAMID would conduct operations in a coordinated and decentralized manner, operating from permanent, temporary and mobile bases, and conduct robust patrols, establish checkpoints and perform observation and escort activities which would be complemented by active liaison and coordination with parties to the conflict at all levels. To ensure a timely response to any changes in the situation, the reserve force, including military aviation assets, would be maintained and kept in a state of high readiness to facilitate deployment in extremis.

Police concept

44. The police component would focus on: (a) supporting the physical protection of civilians and facilitating humanitarian assistance; (b) creating a protective environment by coordinating the development and training of the Sudanese police forces; and (c) conducting community-oriented policing initiatives in conjunction with the United Nations country team, including on gender-based and sexual violence and child protection, pursued through engagement with the state liaison offices and at the national level. The police concept foresees enabling the host State authorities to tackle rule of law challenges and build trust between the local communities and Government entities.

45. The current number of personnel in formed police units charged with security tasks of team sites in Saraf Omra should be adjusted from 140 to 180, in order to provide for the increased security measures at the team site and for an operational capacity to support activities conducted by individual police officers, and to allow for

an operational reserve to react to changes in the security situation. In view of the particular security requirements, two formed police units (140 personnel each) would be deployed to Kalma. Continued deployment of one formed police unit of 140 personnel would be required in Zalingei in order to tackle security issues of a non-military nature, such as demonstrations and engagements with internally displaced persons. Formed police units with 180 personnel each would take over the security tasks of the team sites in Kutum, Tawilla, Shangil Tobaya and Khor Abeche.

46. A maximum of 10 individual police officers would deploy to each of the newly established state liaison offices, and a maximum of 5 to the Khartoum liaison office. The strength of the police component would be reduced from 2,500 to 1,870 personnel, and would include 550 individual police officers and 1,320 formed police units.

Clearance of explosive remnants of war

47. The improved security situation is offering opportunities for increased clearance of explosive remnants of war as additional areas become accessible for the first time since the mission's establishment. As a result, systematic survey and clearance operations are now possible with little risk of recontamination. Thus far, the present reporting period has seen an increase in the detection and disposal of unexploded ordinance of roughly 31 per cent, compared with the previous reporting period. Since such clearance is a key enabler of the mission's military and protection work and is crucial to the facilitation of voluntary returns, it will remain a key component of the mission's work. At the same time, a transition of the expected remaining workload to partners, including the National Mine Action Centre of the Sudan, the United Nations Children's Fund and the International Committee of the Red Cross, should be prepared.

B. Transition concept

48. The whole-of-system transition concept would focus on providing sustainable solutions to the critical drivers of conflict, within a two-year time frame, through four substantive areas identified as critical to preventing relapse and enabling the Government, the United Nations country team, civil society partners and international actors to prepare for the mission's envisaged exit. The transition phase would provide an opportunity for UNAMID and the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to identify key shared priorities in those four areas and to collaborate, through joint planning and delivery, towards their achievement. The conclusions of the strategic review point to the adoption of a pragmatic approach during the transition phase that focuses on concrete joint transition activities in areas where collaboration between UNAMID and the United Nations country team is already in place and the focusing of attention on ensuring that sufficient resources are made available to the United Nations country team to ramp up its peacebuilding and development work in Darfur. Joint efforts would be made to ensure that gains in humanitarian access are maintained during and following the drawdown, including continued United Nations Humanitarian Air Service flights to areas in need.

49. Given that the African Union remains an integral partner during the transition period in Darfur, it is expected that the African Union Commission, through its relevant departments, would also engage the Government, the United Nations country team and UNAMID to provide the necessary assistance. The Commission would play a key role in furthering the political process towards a sustainable resolution to the Darfur conflict and in areas such as security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and other key governance areas, as has been highlighted in various Peace and Security Council communiqués on Darfur.

50. Shared priorities are being drawn from the critical needs identified in existing planning documents, including the integrated strategic framework, the Darfur Development Strategy, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and the Multi-Year Humanitarian Strategy 2017–2019 for the Sudan. Priorities for Darfur are also being drawn from the United Nations country team/humanitarian country team approach to durable solutions, which has been piloted in the Sudan as part of the "New Way of Working". During the transition phase, United Nations country team and UNAMID partners would focus on the priorities set out below.

Rule of law, police, justice, corrections

51. Joint UNAMID-United Nations country team support in the rule of law area would focus on supporting Government authorities in extending the rule of law (specifically access to justice) and State authority to remote areas to build public confidence in rule of law and law enforcement institutions, reduce intercommunal conflict, enhance accountability and create conditions conducive to durable solutions and the voluntary return of displaced populations. Interventions would strengthen the capacities of State authority and community-based conflict management and reconciliation mechanisms to mediate and address resource-based and local conflicts and strengthen legislation and policies on land and resource management.

52. The transition in the rule of law area would require a two-pronged approach that identified: (a) areas of intervention that could be completed by UNAMID within a two-year time frame and handed over to national authorities, such as capacity-building programmes for rural court judges (to be handed over to the federal judicial training centre), trial monitoring (to be handed over to national NGOs) and the capacity-building and professionalization of the prison service; and (b) areas of intervention that would require continued support from United Nations country team partners to prevent a relapse into conflict, such as the presence and functioning of rural courts, community policing, capacity-building and legal aid. Considering the nature of the support provided to the Special Court and Special Prosecutor for Crimes in Darfur, the mission is best placed to continue its support to that process and should prioritize it.

Resilience and livelihoods durable solutions for the displaced population and host communities

53. Strategies and plans to implement integrated durable solutions would be developed in a participatory and consultative manner that involved local partners and communities. They would include interventions that respond to the needs of the highly vulnerable populations, including nomads and pastoralists, and conflict-affected communities, with the objective of protecting and recovering assets and stabilizing livelihoods. To ensure the success of and benefits from durable solutions, beneficiaries must enjoy safety, integrity and protection, therefore protective environments in the areas of displacement and return are crucial. Durable solutions would work towards achieving socioeconomic integration within communities through strengthening access to essential services (health, education, nutrition), utilities (water, energy, land) and shelter. In that context, land issues are central to the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and to achieving durable solutions, which makes cooperation on and the continuation of existing projects with the Darfur Land Commission and State authorities essential.

Immediate service delivery for internally displaced persons

54. Immediate needs in Darfur remain focused on delivering services to the most vulnerable persons. Assistance would be needs-based, and the issues of protection, livelihoods, reinforcing community assets and services and social cohesion would be

the focus of programming. Vulnerability assessments have identified 376,000 internally displaced persons who would be able to transition to livelihood activities or seasonal food distributions, while 716,000 would continue to receive year-round food assistance. Those vulnerable house' olds that remain in need of relief assistance would continue to receive the required humanitarian support. The goal would be to improve access, in a more sustainable manner, to basic services such as health, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for All and education.

Human rights

55. Outside the mission's redefined area of operations, UNAMID would contribute to monitoring and reporting on human rights and to capacity-building to strengthen Government institutions and civil society and community-based organizations with regard to good governance. UNAMID, with increased support from the United Nations country team, would prioritize strengthening State institutions, awareness-raising, education and support to community structures that empower rights-holders, including internally displaced persons and returnee populations. The United Nations country team would assume some of those functions, including mainstreaming work on protection, child protection, the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence and the return of internally displaced persons. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) should open a fully mandated office in the Sudan in order to assist in the strengthening of human rights protections, despite the lack of progress to date regarding the engagement of OHCHR with the Government of the Sudan on a possible technical cooperation programme.

Implementation

56. To facilitate the transition of the above priority areas, it is crucial that United Nations partners reinforce collaborative efforts to enable joint planning and delivery towards clearly defined shared objectives. That should include collaboration at the strategic level, including structural links between the Deputy Joint Special Representative and the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, and at the technical level through the establishment of joint teams at the state level and an enhanced UNAMID presence in Khartoum. With that in mind, the recommendation of the strategic review is to establish liaison offices in the capitals of four Darfur states (except Central Darfur, where the mission headquarters would be), where key substantive UNAMID components and United Nations country team staff should be co-located, to the extent possible, to form joint teams. The composition of those offices would be determined by the needs of the location. In terms of logistical considerations, existing UNAMID offices could be used in some areas, while in other places existing United Nations country team offices could be upgraded or new spaces identified. UNAMID should provide funding for those offices for the remainder of the mission's lifespan and UNDP, as the common service manager, would manage them. Available headquarters resources to help plan and initiate joint approaches, including through the global focal point arrangement and the Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity, should be considered as required. While such an arrangement would enable support for the capacities of the United Nations country team, including on human rights, the proposed reconfiguration would no longer allow UNAMID to continue the monitoring, verification and reporting of protection of civilians issues outside the greater Jebel Marra area, and the United Nations country team has limited scope to monitor, raise and address protection concerns.

Funding for longer term development in Darfur

57. As the mission withdraws, it is critical that longer-term funding arrangements be put in place to prevent a relapse into conflict. A successful transition from

peacekeeping to a peacebuilding- and development-oriented United Nations engagement requires an integrated resource mobilization strategy as well as high-level efforts to mobilize donor funding. The United Nations joint financing approach for sustaining peace in Darfur calls for the financing approach to be centred on the political engagement of the United Nations system, to reach out to traditional and non-traditional partners and to involve the Government of the Sudan in both facilitating the implementation of the integrated strategic framework and seeking the allocation of its own resources. In addition, as a transitional measure, the joint approach should focus on both raising voluntary contributions and acquiring funding from the assessed budget. Those transitional funding arrangements would ensure the establishment and operationalization of the state liaison offices and support for the implementation of the shared priorities in order to sustain gains in peace and security.

58. The Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund could be a crucial enabler for the transition. Ongoing efforts with the Peacebuilding Support Office should be reinforced to access funding for transition priorities and piloting other potential initiatives through the New Way of Working and for durable solutions that contribute to consolidating peace in Darfur. In response to the mission's transition, the United Nations country team in the Sudan is in the process of finalizing a project on durable solutions and support for the rule of law in Darfur with the support of the Immediate Response Facility of the Peacebuilding Fund. In addition, the Secretary-General also received a request from the President of the Sudan in late December 2017 expressing his interest in having the Sudan be declared eligible to receive funds from the Peacebuilding Fund.

59. Bringing those different strands together, new funding should be channelled through the existing United Nations Fund for Recovery, Reconstruction and Development in Darfur. As the contribution to the Fund from Qatar will be exhausted in 2018, it is important to diversify its funding base. For the new phase of support during the transition process, the Fund could potentially consist of funding from: (a) the Peacebuilding Fund (if the Sudan qualifies for full eligibility), to be allocated towards specific projects; (b) assessed contributions from Member States, if approved by the General Assembly; (c) seed funding from UNDP; and (d) a targeted effort to encourage existing partners to renew their funding commitments beyond 2018, coupled with attracting new donors to support the Fund. Channelling resources through the Fund would allow the United Nations country team to strengthen programming on peacebuilding and provide a framework for other donors to contribute voluntary contributions in a strategic manner.

C. Implementation arrangements, time frame and mission leadership

60. The main components of the implementation of the revised mission concept would be: (a) the mission drawdown and repositioning, which would consist of the repatriation of the military and police elements, the closure of team sites and supercamps, the right-sizing of the civilian staff and the enhanced joint working modalities with the United Nations country team; (b) the operationalization of the new mission headquarters, consisting of the functional establishment of all mission components in Zalingei; (c) the establishment of state liaison offices in El Fasher, El Geneina, Nyala and Ed Daein; and (d) liquidation. The reconfiguration of the Operation would start immediately following the adoption of a new mandate by the Security Council, and its liquidation phase would be completed, at the latest, by December 2020. As different elements in the four components would take place simultaneously, mission support should be organized into two focus areas: the delivery of the mandated tasks in the mission's new area of responsibility, and the mission's drawdown and closure.

61. In the context of the new mission concept, the Joint Special Representative for Darfur would be located in Khartoum with immediate effect, to follow up on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and on the peace process and to maintain a close interaction with the Government. The Joint Special Representative would continue to exercise overall authority over the mission's strategic objectives and operations and frequently travel to the area of operations. The Deputy Joint Special Representative for Darfur would be posted in Zalingei to lead the day-to-day operations of the mission. The leadership of the military and police components, as well as the heads of sections/divisions of the civilian components, with the exception of mission support, should be right-sized to reflect the reduced footprint of the Operation, in line with levels of other operations of a similar size.

62. Provided that there will be no significant change in the security situation in Darfur and key indicators are fulfilled (see annex), the implementation time frame would adhere broadly to the following schedule: (a) by 31 August 2018, all planning processes and institutional arrangements with the Government should be completed, including a revised budget submission containing the new staffing structures; (b) by 31 December 2018, the UNAMID headquarters in Zalingei and the state liaison offices should be functional and the right-sizing of the civilian staff, following an alignment of the staffing requirements with the reconfigured mission staffing structures, should be completed; (c) the closure of the team sites outside the UNAMID area of responsibility and the repatriation of the assigned military and police units should be completed by 31 March 2019; (d) by June 2019 at the latest, the former sector headquarters in El Geneina, Nyala and Ed Daein should be closed down and handed over; and (e) the Operation would exit on 30 June 2020, and its liquidation would be completed by December 2020.

63. The cooperation of the Government with the reconfiguration is essential in order to facilitate the closure of team sites and the repatriation of equipment, as well as to enable freedom of movement within the new area of operations. The Government's further and continued investment in Darfur and the proactive cooperation on the transition concept, not least with regard to human rights, will also be of paramount importance to ensure the security and delivery of services to its population.

64. To monitor progress against the priorities of the mission and the transition, a two-year action plan should be developed on the basis of the provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. As noted in the letter dated 30 August 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/747) on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, provisions from the Doha Document could serve as the basis for indicators of achievement for the eventual exit of UNAMID (see annex). Proven progress with respect to the action plan during the two-year transition period and further improvements in the security situation, accompanied by sustained Government investment in Darfur, would be essential in order to allow UNAMID to exit Darfur.

V. Financial aspects

65. The General Assembly, in its resolution 72/259, appropriated the amount of $910.9 million for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, inclusive of the amount of $486.0 million previously authorized for the Operation for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2017 under the terms of its resolution 71/310. The proposed budget in the amount of $782.6 million for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 (A/72/794) has been submitted to the Assembly for its consideration during the

second part of its resumed seventy-second session. It should be noted that proposed requirements are based on the prevailing mandate and scope of the Operation.

66. As at 16 May 2018, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNAMID amounted to $244.7 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $2,147.0 million.

67. Reimbursement of troop and formed police costs has been made for the period up to 31 January 2018, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 30 September 2017, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

VI. Observations

68. Improvements in the overall security situation in Darfur have created the conditions for UNAMID to prepare its exit after more than 10 years in the Sudan. The military successes of the Government against the rebel movements have visibly changed the landscape, despite the failed incursion of two rebel groups from Libya and South Sudan in May and June 2017 to establish a foothold in Darfur, and for the second dry season in a row no major operation has taken place. The weapons collection campaign, initiated in August 2017, has strengthened the control of the Government over the territory and created the conditions for the extension of State authority across Darfur. In the light of that, the presence of the African Union and the United Nations needs to adapt so as to serve the current needs of the population of Darfur. It is in that spirit that we propose a reconfiguration of our presence to deploy peacekeeping where it is still needed and to increase early recovery and development efforts to address root causes of conflict and consolidate and sustain peace. We therefore present to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations Security Council a whole-of-system approach for Darfur, which includes a new concept of operations for UNAMID and a transition concept that maps an exit for the peacekeeping mission, during which UNAMID would work in collaboration with the United Nations country team over a two-year time frame.

69. Crucial grievances at the origin of the conflict, however, remain unaddressed. The parties continue to extend their unilateral ceasefires, but a comprehensive cessation of hostilities has yet to be finalized. The implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur is slow, and roughly one third of the population of Darfur continues to bear the consequences of displacement. Although no major displacement has taken place during the past two years, durable and pragmatic solutions need to be found to enable the settlement of almost 2 million internally displaced persons. The recent practices of some state governments in Darfur in that context need to be considered, as does advocating for the principles of voluntary return and the right to access land. The successes of the local governments and the native administration in reducing intercommunal violence, with the mission's support, should be sustained through adequate measures for addressing issues related to land and resources. The positive impact of the weapons collection campaign on the security situation and the control over the armed militia need to be reinforced with measures based on the provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

70. The full implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in order to benefit the people of Darfur and avoid relapse into conflict is crucial. Our proposal and the exit of UNAMID are intrinsically linked to that implementation, and we urge the Government to do its utmost to provide security, rule of law and basic services to all its citizens in Darfur, and to address the root causes of the conflict within that framework. We also call on donor countries to provide the necessary financial support so that early recovery, peacebuilding and development activities can be undertaken in

a sustainable manner. We have invested too much in Darfur over the past decade and a half to risk it backsliding into conflict due to a lack of resources. Such support is even more critical in the light of the current economic crisis, which has had a serious impact, especially in rural areas, and is a threat to stability.

71. Finally, we would like to extend our gratitude to the men and women of UNAMID, the United Nations and the humanitarian community, who continue their relentless efforts to improve the lives of the people of Darfur. We would also like to thank and commend the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur, Kingsley Jeremiah Mamabolo, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan, Nicholas Haysom, and the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, and the former President of Nigeria, Abdulsalami Abubakar, of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, for their steadfast commitment to sustainable peace and stability in the Sudan.

Annex

Indicators of achievement for the proposed two-year time frame for the withdrawal of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

In view of the letter dated 30 August 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/747) on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the provisions from the Doha Document set out below could serve as indicators of achievement for the proposed two-year time frame for the withdrawal of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

1. Security sector

   - Reform of some military institutions in Darfur and need for funding and experts [*art. 74, paras. 463–464*]
   - Disarmament of militia groups and the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan [*art. 67, paras. 399–401*]
   - Voluntary civilian arms control [*art. 71, paras. 416–417*]
   - Disarmament and demobilization of Movements' combatants [*art. 72, paras. 422 and 430–432*]

2. Rule of law: police, justice, corrections

   - Facilitate access to justice [*art. 56, para. 296*]
   - Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission fully functioning [*art. 58, paras. 311–321*]
   - Special Court for Darfur [*art. 59, paras. 322–328*]

3. Durable solutions for the displaced population and host communities

   - Mechanisms and modalities in place to ensure freedom of movement of internally displaced persons [*art. 46, paras. 235–237; art. 47, para. 238; art. 48, paras. 239–240*]
   - Conditions in place to ensure the right to voluntary return [*art. 49, paras. 241–246*]
   - Mechanisms in place to ensure necessary conditions for return of internally displaced persons [*art. 50, para. 249*]
   - Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission fully functioning [*art. 51, paras. 252–259*]
   - Compensation/*Jabr Al-Darar* mechanism fully functional [*art. 57, paras. 301–304*]
   - Establish mechanisms to ensure sustainable management and use of lands and other natural resources [*art. 33, para. 186*]
   - Modify the laws to include rights to land and its use (*hawakeer*) [*art. 33, para. 182*]
   - Darfur states land use mapping database developed [*art. 38, para. 197*]
   - Darfur Land Commission exercising full competences [*art. 38, paras. 196–207*]
   - Darfur states to be represented by three non-permanent members in the National Petroleum Commission [*art. 41, para. 214*]

- Oil-producing states to benefit 2 per cent of oil revenue [*art. 41, para. 215*]

4. Immediate delivery of services for internally displaced persons

- Modalities in place to provide security and protection from all forms of physical attack [*art. 44, paras. 226–229; art. 45, paras. 230–231*]
- Joint coordination committees to deal with early warning and prevention of escalation: local government and native administrations are empowered to address consequences of the conflict [*art. 13, para. 86*]

5. Human rights

- Promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms [*art. 1, paras. 1–18; art. 61, para. 331*]